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Darwiche and Pearl’s seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline princi-
ples for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates,
have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. However, most of the
suggestions for doing so have been radical enough to result in a dubious ‘re-
ductionist’ principle that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. The
present paper offers a more modest strengthening of Darwiche and Pearl’s pro-
posal. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a
posterior conditional belief set, our new principles govern the relation between
two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by differ-
ent revisions. We show that operators from the family that these principles
characterise, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can
be represented as relating belief states that are associated with a ‘proper ordi-
nal interval’ assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering
of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated
versions of a large number of AGM era postulates.
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1. Introduction
Belief change is a well established subfield of AI, with important connec-
tions to a number of other areas, most notably nonmonotonic reasoning (see
for instance [2] for an early discussion). One of the most pressing and con-
tentious issues that it faces is the handling of so-called ‘iterated’ belief revision:
establishing plausible rationality constraints on the result of a sequence of suc-
cessive revisions. This was identified as an open problem in Hansson’s ‘Ten
philosophical problems of belief revision’ [3] and remains as such, over fifteen
years later.
Darwiche & Pearl’s [4] seminal paper on the topic proposed a number of pop-
ular baseline principles for iterated revision, constraining the relation between
the beliefs resulting from single revisions (that is, the agent’s prior ‘conditional
beliefs’) and the beliefs resulting from sequences of two revisions (equivalently:
the agent’s posterior conditional beliefs after a single revision).
These principles, the DP postulates, have been strengthened in various man-
ners. However, most proposals for doing so–such as natural [5], lexicographic
[6], and restrained [7] revision (see [8] for an overview)–have yielded sets of
principles that are powerful enough to entail the following strong ‘reductionist’
principle: the set of beliefs held by an agent after a sequence of two revisions is
fully determined by the agent’s single-step revision dispositions or again condi-
tional beliefs. Given the AGM postulates for single-step revision of Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors and Makinson [9], this thesis can alternatively be cashed out in
terms of an identification of belief states, the relata of the revision function,
with total preorders (TPO’s) over possible worlds. Booth & Chandler [10] have
recently provided a counterexample that shows the reductionist position to be
too strong: states require more structure than that provided by a mere TPO.
In this paper, we supplement the DP postulates, alongside a popular princi-
ple termed ‘(P)’ by Booth & Meyer [7] and ‘Independence’ by Jin & Thielscher
[11], with a number of novel conditions, which, like these, only govern sequences
of two revisions, rather than sequences of arbitrarily many such operations. But
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while the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior
conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between
two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different
revisions.
We take as our foil two postulates of this variety considered by Booth &
Meyer [12]. These played a key role in characterising a family of so-called non-
prioritised revision operators, for which they offered a representation in terms
of what we shall call ‘proper ordinal interval (POI) assignments’. We show that
these two postulates become implausible in the context of prioritised revision,
which is the focus of the present paper. First of all, they turn out to characterise
lexicographic revision when one supplements the remaining postulates of Booth
& Meyer, i.e. (P) and the DP postulates, with the AGM postulate of Success.
Secondly, they fall prey to an intuitive class of counterexample.
If adding Success to Booth & Meyer’s postulates is not an option, how might
we devise a prioritised revision operator that satisfies the former while retaining
as much of the latter as possible? Our strategy here proceeds semantically: we
seek to minimally transform the posterior TPO obtained by Booth & Meyer’s
method of non-prioritised revision in such a way that Success is assured. We
show that this is achieved by adding a ‘naturalisation’ step, which is essentially
an application of Boutillier’s natural revision operation.
We call the resulting family of iterated revision operators, which subsumes
both lexicographic and restrained revision operators, the family of POI revi-
sion operators. These operators turn out to satisfy two weakenings of Booth
& Meyer’s postulates, which have not yet been discussed in the literature and
which neatly avoid the counterexamples raised against their stronger counter-
parts. After characterising POI revision, both semantically and syntactically,
we show how the additional structure of POI assignments also provides sufficient
resources to handle Booth & Chandler’s counterexample to reductionism. We
close the paper by noting that POI revision operators satisfy iterated versions
of a large number of AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion.
The plan of the remainder of the article is as follows. In the fairly substantial
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Section 2, we first introduce some basic terminology and definitions, recapitu-
lating some recent work on iterated revision which the remainder of the paper
builds on. Section 3 introduces the two strong postulates of Booth & Meyer,
whose associated semantic framework we then present in Section 4. These pos-
tulates are critically discussed in Section 5. Section 6 outlines our construction
of the POI family of operators. In Section 7, we discuss the weakenings of Booth
& Meyer’s postulates that are satisfied by the members of our new family. In
Section 8, the family is characterised semantically and syntactically, in two dif-
ferent manners. In Section 9, we show how the additional expressive power of
POI assignments allows us to adequately model Booth & Chandler’s counterex-
ample to the equation of states with TPO’s. We wrap up the paper with a
discussion, in Section 10, of the extent to which the members of the POI family
satisfy extensions of various strong AGM era postulates to the iterated case. We
then conclude in Section 11. We provide a sizeable technical appendix, which
contains an example of a family of POI revision operators with a ‘concrete’
representation of belief states (Appendix A), as well as complete proofs of the
various technical results (Appendix B).
2. Preliminaries
The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief state Ψ. Ψ determines
a belief set [Ψ], a deductively closed set of sentences, drawn from a finitely
generated propositional, truth-functional language L. Logical equivalence is
denoted by ≡ and the set of logical consequences of Γ ⊆ L by Cn(Γ). The
set of propositional worlds is denoted by W , and the set of models of a given
sentence A is denoted by [[A]]. We occasionally abuse notation and use x to
denote not a world but a sentence. In particular, whenever a world x appears
within the scope of a logical connective, it should be understood as referring
to some sentence whose set of models is exactly {x}. So, for example, given
x, y ∈W , the sentence x ∨ y is such that [[x ∨ y]] = {x, y}.
In terms of belief dynamics, our principal focus is on iterated revision–rather
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than contraction–operators, which return, for any prior belief state Ψ and consis-
tent sentence A, the posterior belief state Ψ∗A that results from an adjustment
of Ψ to accommodate the inclusion of A in [Ψ].
2.1. Single step revision
The function ∗ is assumed to satisfy the AGM postulates of [9, 4]–henceforth
‘AGM’, for short:
(K1∗) Cn([Ψ ∗A]) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]
(K2∗) A ∈ [Ψ ∗A] (aka ‘Success’)
(K3∗) [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A})
(K4∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ], then Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]
(K5∗) [Ψ ∗A] is consistent
(K6∗) If A ≡ B, then [Ψ ∗A] = [Ψ ∗B]
(K7∗) [Ψ ∗A ∧B] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {B})
(K8∗) If ¬B /∈ [Ψ ∗A], then Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {B}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∧B]
This ensures the following convenient representability of single-shot revision:
each Ψ has associated with it a total preorder2 4Ψ over W such that [[[Ψ∗A]]] =
min(4Ψ, [[A]]), where min(4Ψ, [[A]]) := {x ∈ [[A]] | ∀y ∈ [[A]], x 4 y} [13, 14].
This ordering is sometimes interpreted in terms of relative ‘(im)plausibility’, so
that x 4Ψ y iff x is considered at least as ‘plausible’ as y in state Ψ. In this
context, Success corresponds to the requirement that min(4Ψ∗A,W ) ⊆ [[A]].
The single-shot revision dispositions associated with Ψ can also be repre-
sented by a ‘conditional belief set’ [Ψ]c. This set extends the belief set [Ψ] by
further including various ‘conditional beliefs’, of the form A ⇒ B, where ⇒
is a non-truth-functional conditional connective. This is achieved by means of
the so-called Ramsey Test ([15], [16]), according to which A ⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c iff
B ∈ [Ψ ∗A].
2A total preorder is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive and complete.
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Following convention, we shall call principles couched in terms of belief sets
‘syntactic’, and principles couched in terms of TPO’s ‘semantic’. The principles
that we will discuss will be given in both types of format, with the distinction
reflected in the nomenclature by the use of a subscript ‘4’ to denote semantic
principles.
We shall also be touching on a broader class of non-prioritised iterated ‘re-
vision’ operators, for which Success does not necessarily hold. These will be
denoted by the symbol ◦. To avoid ambiguity, we will follow a convention of su-
perscripting every principle governing a belief change operator with the relevant
operator symbol (here: ∗ or ◦).
2.2. Two step revision
In terms of its behaviour under two iterations, ∗ will be assumed to sat-
isfy the DP postulates of [4], which constrain the belief set resulting from two
successive revisions, or, equivalently, the conditional belief set resulting from a
single revision:
(C1∗) If A ∈ Cn(B), then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C2∗) If ¬A ∈ Cn(B), then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C3∗) If A ∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
(C4∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then ¬A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
The semantic counterparts of these principles are given by:
(C1∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C2∗4) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C3∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
(C4∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ y, then x 4Ψ∗A y
Booth & Chandler [10] have effectively recently shown that the DP postulates
can be collectively recast in terms of a pair of binary relations of overruling and
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strict overruling, introduced in [12]. These make a number of appearances later
on in this paper and are defined as follows:
Definition 1. Where A and B are consistent sentences in L, B overrules A (in
Ψ) if A 6∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B], while B strictly overrules A (in Ψ) if ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B].3
Indeed, their Observation 2, building on a result of Booth & Meyer [12, Propo-
sition 6], establishes, given the above definition, that the DP postulates are
collectively equivalent to:
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] =

[Ψ ∗B], if B strictly overrules A
[Ψ ∗B] ∩ [Ψ ∗A ∧B], if B overrules A, but not strictly
[Ψ ∗A ∧B], if B does not overrule A
So, once the relation between B and A in terms of overruling is determined, the
results of various single revisions by combinations of A and B are sufficient to
give us the result of a sequence of two successive revisions by A and then B. To
put this in the form of a slogan: Two-step revision is single-step revision plus
overruling (or lack thereof).
Beyond the DP postulates, we impose two further constraints on two step
revision. First, we impose a principle of irrelevance of syntax that we shall call
‘Equivalence’:
(Eq∗) If A ≡ B and C ≡ D, then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ C] = [(Ψ ∗B) ∗D]
or semantically
(Eq∗4) If A ≡ B, then 4Ψ∗A=4Ψ∗B
3Incidentally, the first relation also corresponds to the condition under which Chandler
[17] proposed that one takes B to provide a reason to not believe A. The second relation is
related to the condition under which he claimed one takes B to provide a reason to believe ¬A
[18]. There is also a clear connection here with Pollock’s well known concepts of undercutting
and rebutting defeaters [19].
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Second, we assume that ∗ satisfies the principle (P∗), which strengthens both
(C3∗) and (C4∗):
(P∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
Its semantic counterpart is given by:
(P∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
Satisfaction of AGM, (Eq∗), (C1∗), (C2∗) and (P∗) means that ∗ is an ‘admis-
sible’ revision operator, in the sense of [7].
2.3. Reductionism: states as TPO’s?
The constraints considered so far are notably satisfied by two well-known
kinds of revision operators: restrained operators and lexicographic operators.4
In semantic terms, these both promote the minimal A-worlds in the prior TPO
to become minimal worlds in the posterior TPO. Regarding the rest of the
ordering, restrained revision operators preserve the strict ordering ≺Ψ while
additionally making every A-world x strictly lower ranked than every ¬A-world
y for which x ∼Ψ y (where ∼Ψ is the symmetric closure of 4Ψ), so that x 4Ψ∗A y
iff:
(i) x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and either
(a) x ≺Ψ y or
(b) x ∼Ψ y and (x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]]).
4Note the use of the plural here: we speak of restrained/lexicographic operators. It is of
course customary, in the literature, to refer to the restrained/lexicographic operator. However,
this way of speaking is only appropriate to the extent that belief states are identifiable with
TPO’s.
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Lexicographic revision operators make every A-world lower ranked than every
¬A-world, while preserving the ordering within each of [[A]] and [[¬A]], so that
x 4Ψ∗A y iff:
(i) x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], or
(ii) (x ∈ [[A]] iff y ∈ [[A]]) and x 4Ψ y.
Natural revision operators, however, fail to satisfy (P∗) and are thus not mem-
bers of the family of admissible revision operators. These operators simply
promote the minimal A-worlds to be 4Ψ∗A-minimal, while leaving everything
else unchanged, so that x 4Ψ∗A y iff:
(i) x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ y.
Importantly, these three operators share the rather strong property of effectively
equating belief states with TPO’s. Booth & Chandler [10], however, offered a
number of counterexamples to this identification, one of these being the follow-
ing:
Example 1. Bashiir and Ayaan have been invited to a party. Initially unsure
as to whether either wanted to attend, I now hear that the venue is located too
far out of town for either of them. I also believe that they don’t get on and are
unlikely to attend the same party.
Example 2. As above, save that I believe that Bashiir and Ayaan have never
met and know nothing about each other.
Let A = ‘Ayaan will attend’ and B = ‘Bashiir will attend’. With Ψ being the
belief state in which I am after having heard of the party’s location, Booth
& Chandler argue that the following holds: (1) ¬A ∈ [Ψ] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ], (2)
¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A], and (3) A,B /∈ [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B]. Assuming L has
atoms {A,B}, AGM dictates that Ψ is associated with the same single TPO in
both examples, which is represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Representation of the unique TPO Ψ associated with both Example 1
and Example 2, assuming a language with atomic sentences {A,B}. The relation Ψ
orders the worlds from bottom to top, with the minimal world on the lowest level. The
columns group worlds according to the sentences that they validate. We write ‘AB’
for A ∧B’ and ‘A’ for ‘¬A’.
As Booth & Chandler note, (1)–(3) do not, even given AGM and DP, determine
whether or not A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. But this underdetermination, they claim,
is precisely in order. With respect to Example 1, they argue that, potentially,
¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B], if the belief Ayaan and Bashiir’s mutual dislike is sufficiently
deeply entrenched. On the other hand, regarding Example 2, we clearly have
A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. If their point is well taken, it follows that the overruling
relations of Definition 1, which we have seen to be critical in determining the
result of a twofold revision, are not representable in terms of a structure as
coarse-grained as a TPO: further information is required.
3. Two principles of non-prioritised revision
The DP postulates, as well as (P∗), constrain the relation between a prior
conditional belief set on the one hand, and a posterior one on the other. But
one might wonder what kinds of constraints govern the relation between two
posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different re-
visions.
To the best of our knowledge, the only two articles to consider principles
of this nature are [12] and, more briefly, [20]. In the former, a slightly more
general form of the following pair of syntactic principles is discussed (where the
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letter ‘s’ in the name stands for ‘strong’, to draw a contrast with some weaker
versions discussed below):
(sβ1∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(sβ2∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
whose semantic counterparts are given by:
(sβ1∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
(sβ2∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
On the relative plausibility interpretation of 4Ψ, the latter can be informally
glossed as follows: if (i) there exists some potential evidence, consistent with
a world x but not with a world y, such that x would be considered no more
plausible than (respectively: strictly less plausible than) y after receiving it, then
(ii) there is no potential evidence whatsoever that would lead x to be considered
more plausible than (respectively: at least as plausible as) y.
It is easy to see that, on the assumption that 4Ψ∗>=4Ψ (which follows from




4), which correspond to the
special cases in which C is a tautology.
These postulates can be interpreted in terms of the overruling and strict
overruling introduced above, in Definition 1. (sβ1∗) tells us that, if B overrules
A in Ψ, then A will not be believed following any sequence of two revisions
starting in Ψ ending with B, while (sβ2∗) says that, if B strictly overrules A in
Ψ, then A will be rejected following any such sequence of two revisions.
4. Proper ordinal intervals for non-prioritised revision
We remarked above that it was a more general form of (sβ1∗), (sβ2∗) and
their semantic counterparts that interested Booth & Meyer. The reason for this
is that their topic of interest was not in fact ∗, but rather a more general kind
of operator: a non-prioritised ‘revision’ operator ◦, which does not necessarily
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satisfy the Success postulate. They showed that these operators could be rep-
resented as relating belief states associated with a particular type of structure.
The general idea behind their construction is that two-step revision ought to
be guided, not by an ordering of the mere set of worlds W , but by a particular
kind of ordering of a corresponding set of signed worlds W± = {wi | w ∈
W and i ∈ {−,+}}. Depending on the input to the first revision, each world
w finds itself represented in this ordering by either a ‘positive’ counterpart w+
(in the event that it validates the input) or a ‘negative’ counterpart w− (in the
event that it invalidates it). The posterior ordering of worlds, which determines
the outcome of the second revision, is then given by the ordering of the relevant
signed worlds.
More formally, let us offer the following key definitions:
Definition 2. ≤ is a proper ordinal interval (POI) assignment to W if it is a
relation over the corresponding set of signed worlds W± := {wi | w ∈W and i ∈
{−,+}} such that:
(≤ 1) ≤ is a TPO
(≤ 2) x+ < x−
(≤ 3) x+ ≤ y+ iff x− ≤ y−.5
5Peppas & Williams [21] have suggested a connection here to the notion of a semiorder.
This concept has a long history of applications in the cognitive and decision sciences (see [22]
for a book-length treatment) and has recently surfaced in the belief revision literature, in the
context of the semantic representation of certain weakenings of the AGM postulates ([23, 24,
21]). The class of semiorders subsumes that of TPO’s, relaxing the condition of transitivity
of indifference. The connection to the present framework is presumably the following: as is
well known, semiorders are representable by mapping elements onto the members of a set of
constant-length intervals on the real line, such that x ≺ y if the interval associated with x
lies strictly to the left of the one associated with y and x ∼ y otherwise. POI assignments
correspond to classes of such mappings, closed under order-preserving transformations. So
every POI assignment generates a unique semiorder. However, the converse, of course, does
not hold. Indeed, the representation of semiorders is unique up to a range of transformations
that is broader than the order-preserving ones. In particular, any two interval representations
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Definition 3. Where 4 is a TPO over W and ≤ is a POI assignment to W ,
we say that ≤ is faithful to 4 if it satisfies:
(≤ 4) x+ ≤ y+ iff x 4 y.
We write (i) xδ < yε if xδ ≤ yε but yε 6≤ xδ and (ii) xδ=̇yε if xδ ≤ yε and
yε ≤ xδ.
Booth & Meyer assumed that each belief state Ψ is associated, not only with
a TPO 4Ψ, but with a POI assignment ≤Ψ that is faithful to 4Ψ (they remained
agnostic as to whether states are to be identified with POI assignments; we will
follow suit). This assignment was then taken to determine the agent’s posterior
TPO upon revision by A, i.e. 4Ψ◦A, in the following manner:
Definition 4. ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator if ◦ is a function
from state-sentence pairs to states, such that for every state Ψ there is a POI




x+ if x ∈ [[A]]
x− if x ∈ [[¬A]].
We can see from this that, as we stated above, the informal interpretation of
the semantics is that the positive and negative counterparts of a world represent
its position in the light of auspicious and inauspicious inputs, respectively. For
a given revision input A and world x, if x ∈ [[A]] the ‘news is good’ for x. If
x ∈ [[¬A]], the ‘news is bad’.
in which the intervals associated with x and y overlap will map onto semiorders for which
x ∼ y. So there is no distinction drawn, for instance, between (i) a representation of the
relation between x and y in which these elements are mapped onto identical intervals and (ii)
a representation in which they are mapped onto distinct but overlapping intervals. But this is
a distinction that typically has repercussions for iterated revision in Booth & Meyer’s scheme,
as well as the one that we offer later on in the paper.
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General forms of our principles (sβ1∗4) and (sβ2
∗
4) turn out to play a key role
in this model. Indeed, Booth & Meyer [12, Theorem 1] show that ◦ is a non-







4), where these principles are obtained from their counterparts
for (prioritised) revision in the obvious manner, by substituting the ◦ symbol
for ∗.
Non-prioritised POI revision operators can helpfully be understood diagram-
matically. Figure 2 represents two proper ordinal interval assignments that are
both faithful to the same TPO, as can be seen by the ordering of the endpoints.
Figure 3 represents, by means of the filled circles, the TPO resulting from the
non-prioritised revisions of the corresponding states by A. The left hand di-
agram in that figure also illustrates failure of Success, since two of the three
minimal worlds in the posterior TPO are in [[¬A]]: sometimes the ‘good news’
for the worlds that validate the input is simply not ‘good enough’.
We note that lexicographic revision operators are special cases of this family
in which x+ <Ψ y
− for all x, y ∈W .6
5. The principles in a prioritised setting
In spite of their arguable appropriateness in a non-prioritised setting, (sβ1∗4)
and (sβ2∗4) prove to be problematically strong when one imposes Success. For
one, it turns out that, in such a context the only kind of operators satisfying
(sβ1∗4) are lexicographic revision operators, and hence that (sβ1
∗
4) imposes the
reductionist assumption that we have suggested is objectionable. Indeed:
Theorem 1. Let ∗ be a revision operator satisfying AGM and (sβ1∗). Then it
also satisfies the Recalcitrance property [6]:
(Rec∗) If A ∧B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B].
6As an anonymous referee for this journal has reminded us, there are also connections
between Booth & Meyer’s proposal and the class of ‘improvement’ operators’ of [25] and [26].
These connections are discussed in some detail in [12, Section 9].
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AB AB AB AB
≤Ψ
AB AB AB AB
≤Ψ′
Figure 2: Distinct POI assignments, respectively associated with states Ψ and Ψ′,
that are faithful to a same TPO. The bottom and top interval endpoints respectively
represent the positive and negative counterparts x+ and x− of each world x.
Proof: If A ∧ B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A ∧ B) ∗ B] from AGM. Then
A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] by (sβ1∗).7 
Since we know (see, e.g., [12, 6]), that lexicographic revision operators are the
only admissible operators satisfying (Rec∗), we obtain the following corollary,
which also gives us an alternative characterisation of lexicographic revision op-
erators:
Corollary 1. The only operators satisfying AGM, (C1∗), (C2∗) and (sβ1∗) are
lexicographic revision operators.8
7If one assumes consistency of revision inputs, it is trivial to show that the implication
also runs the other way, so that (Rec∗) and (sβ1∗) are then equivalent, given AGM: Suppose
A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ B]. Since we thereby implicitly assume consistency of B, A ∧ B must also be
consistent (as, by AGM, A ∧ B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ B] and [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ B] is consistent). Hence, by
(Rec∗), A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B].
8What about (sβ2∗4)? Lexicographic revision satisfies it trivially, since it satisfies: If
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AB AB AB AB
4Ψ◦A
AB AB AB AB
4Ψ′◦A
Figure 3: Posterior TPO’s resulting from non-prioritised revision by A of the states
Ψ and Ψ′ in Figure 2.
These principles also face a class of direct counterexamples that match the
following general pattern: (i) A provides a defeasible reason to believe ¬B and
(ii) C is equivalent to the conjunction of A and a defeater for A’s support for
¬B. Under these conditions, it can plausibly be the case that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B]
but A ∈ [(Ψ∗C)∗B], contradicting both principles. What follows is an example
of a trio of sentences that fit the bill.
Example 3. Let A = ‘She is a pro archer’, B = ‘She missed the target at 5
yards’ and C = ‘She is a pro archer but isn’t wearing her glasses’.
This negative result raises the following question: Is there any way to weaken
(sβ1∗4) and (sβ2
∗
4) to allow a wider, but intuitively plausible, family of iterated
prioritised revision operators? The answer, as we will now show, is ‘yes’.
x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y. We can analogously show that it implies, given AGM,
the following weakening of (Rec∗): If A ∧ B is consistent, then ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. But
this is too weak to allow us to recover (Rec∗) and indeed, (sβ2∗4) is not uniquely satisfied by
lexicographic revision.
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6. Success via naturalisation
Our guiding idea is to take the family of operators discussed in Section
4 and ensure satisfaction of Success, not by adding the principle to the list of
characteristic postulates (we have just seen that this is a non-starter) but rather
by minimally transforming the TPO associated with the posterior belief state in
such a way that the input to revision finds itself included in the posterior belief
set. More specifically, we are seeking a TPO transformation that minimises,
subject to the constraint of Success, the symmetric difference distance dS , given
by:
Definition 5. dS(4,4′) := |(4 − 4′) ∪ (4′ − 4)|.
so that dS(4,4′) counts the disagreements over relations of weak preference
between the two orderings, returning the number of pairs that are in 4 but not
in 4′ and vice versa.
To state our first significant result, let us introduce some notation and ter-
minology:
Definition 6. For all functions ∗ and ◦ from state-sentence pairs to states, ∗
is a naturalisation of ◦ if for all states Ψ and sentences A in L:
x 4Ψ∗A y iff either
(i) x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ◦A y.
N(∗, ◦) means that the couple (∗, ◦) satisfies the relation defined above.
Recalling the definition of natural revision in Section 2.3, we can equivalently
say that ∗ is a naturalisation of ◦ iff it is the composition of a non-prioritised
POI revision operator ◦ and a natural revision operator  , so that:
4Ψ∗A=4(Ψ◦A)A
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It can be shown that the transformation, by means of a naturalisation step, of
the TPO associated with the posterior belief state Ψ ◦ A is ‘minimal’ in the
required sense:
Proposition 1. N(∗, ◦) iff, for all A ∈ L, 4Ψ∗A minimises the symmetric dif-
ference distance dS to 4Ψ◦A, subject to the constraints of AGM.
In view of this, we now offer the following definition:
Definition 7. ∗ is a proper interval order (POI) revision operator if N(∗, ◦) for
some non-prioritised POI revision operator ◦.
and propose that rational revision is POI revision.
Our suggestion generalises one that was made in [7], in which restrained
revision operators were shown to be naturalisations of a particular class of non-
prioritised revision operators due to Papini [27]. Indeed, the latter satisfy:
x 4Ψ◦A y iff (a) x ≺Ψ y or (b) x ∼Ψ y and (x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]]). These
conditions, of course, simply correspond to (ii)(a) and (ii)(b) in the definition of
restrained revision operators given in Section 2. The proposal is also somewhat
reminiscent of the manner in which the Levi Identity [28] treats non-iterated
revision as the composition of a contraction and an expansion ([Ψ ∗ A] = [Ψ÷
¬A] +A, where [Ψ÷¬A] +A := Cn([Ψ÷¬A]∪{A})), with our natural revision
step  playing the role of the expansion step +.
Figure 4 provides a general overview of the model, with the various arrows
denoting functional determination. From bottom to top, each belief state Ψ is
mapped onto a POI assignment ≤Ψ. This POI assignment determines a TPO
4Ψ, such that x 4Ψ y iff x+ ≤Ψ y+. Finally the TPO in turn determines a
belief set [Ψ], such that A ∈ [Ψ] iff min(4Ψ,W ) ⊆ [[A]]. These mappings are
potentially many-to-one, so that we obtain increasingly coarse descriptions of
an agent’s beliefs as one moves upwards. From left to right, the function ◦ maps
the prior belief state Ψ onto an ‘intermediate’ state Ψ ◦ A, before the function




















Figure 4: Functional dependencies in POI revision
We have used dashed arrows to denote some further functional dependencies.
The constraints of [12] ensure that the prior POI assignment ≤Ψ determines the
‘intermediate’ TPO 4Ψ◦A. Finally, the constraints operating on the function 
ensure that this in turn determines the posterior TPO 4Ψ∗A. This last step is
achieved by moving the 4Ψ◦A-minimal A-worlds to the bottom of the ordering.
See Figure 5 for illustration.
The naturalisation step ensures that we have B ∈ [Ψ∗A] iff min(4Ψ, [[A]]) ⊆
[[B]], so AGM will now clearly be satisfied, including Success. Furthermore,
the following general fact about naturalisation establishes that the set of POI
revision operators is a subset of the set of admissible operators:
Proposition 2. For any functions ◦ and ∗ from state-sentence pairs to states,













4). Furthermore, Booth & Meyer show that they also
satisfy (Eq◦4).
The family of POI revision operators includes some familiar figures:
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AB AB AB AB
≤Ψ∗A
Figure 5: Posterior TPO ≤Ψ∗A obtained via naturalisation of the TPO 4Ψ◦A from
Figure 3.
Proposition 3. Both lexicographic and restrained revision operators are POI
revision operators.
Indeed, we have pointed out, at the end of Section 4, that lexicographic revision
operators are themselves non-prioritised POI revision operators. Furthermore,
since they satisfy Success, they will be identical with their own naturalisations.
Regarding restrained revision operators, the result was established in Proposi-
tion 14 of [7]: they are, as we noted above, naturalisations of Papini’s ‘reverse’
lexicographic revision operators, which are non-prioritised POI revision opera-
tors.
Lexicographic revision can be represented by a restriction on the set of per-
missible POI assignments, such that the following is satisfied:
(a) ∀x, y ∈W , x ≺Ψ y iff x+ <Ψ y+ <Ψ x−
(b) ∀x, y ∈W , x ∼Ψ y iff x+ =̇Ψ y+
To obtain restrained revision, (a) is to be replaced by:
(a′) ∀x, y ∈W , x ≺Ψ y iff x− <Ψ y+
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See Figure 6 for a visual representation.9, 10
AB AB AB AB
(a) Restrained
AB AB AB AB
(b) Lexicographic
Figure 6: Representations of restrained and lexicographic revision operators in terms
of alternative POI assignments.
We close this section by noting that the representation of two-step revision
dispositions in terms of POI assignments is unique only up to a certain type
of (admittedly reasonably modest) transformation. To express our result, it is
convenient to introduce the following terminology:
Definition 8. ≤ and ≤′ agree on a set S if ≤ ∩(S × S) =≤′ ∩(S × S)
With this in hand, we can offer:
9Note that while the principles of POI revision generally only constrain two steps of
revision, since they only provide a recipe for obtaining a posterior TPO from a prior POI
assignment, in these two special cases, the posterior TPO itself determines the posterior POI
assignment, via (a) and (b) or (a’) and (b).
10Besides lexicographic and restrained revision operators, which identify states with TPO’s,
there are of course many other operators in the POI family that allow for a ‘concrete’ repre-
sentation of states. In Appendix A, we provide an example, in which the state is this time
represented by a mapping of worlds onto the real numbers. We are grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for suggesting to include such an example in the paper.
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Proposition 4. Let Ψ and Ψ′ be two belief states and ∗ a POI revision operator.
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) ∀A ∈ L,4Ψ∗A=4Ψ′∗A
(2) (a) 4Ψ′=4Ψ=4, and (b) ≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ agree on {x−, y+} for all
x, y ∈W such that
(i) x ≺ y and
(ii) there exists z ∈W such that z 6= x and z ≺ y.
Figure 7 provides an example of two distinct POI assignments yielding the same
posterior TPO after revision by a certain sentence (and hence related by the
relevant transformation).
AB AB AB AB
AB AB AB AB
Figure 7: Two distinct POI assignments yielding the same posterior TPO for all
inputs to revision.
7. Two weaker principles
It is easy to see that neither (sβ1∗4) nor (sβ2
∗
4) are generally satisfied by POI





−. Then y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x, but x ≺Ψ∗x y. However, as
we shall see from Proposition 8 in the next section, we do nevertheless obtain
the following weakened versions of these principles, which incorporate into their
antecedents the further requirement that x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]):
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(β1∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
(β2∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
Regarding the syntactic counterparts of these principles:
Proposition 5. (a) Given AGM, (β1∗4) is equivalent to:
(β1∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(b) Given AGM, (β2∗4) is equivalent to:
(β2∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
These principles are particularly interesting insofar as they avoid the kind of
counterexample to (sβ1∗4) and (sβ2
∗
4) that we raised earlier (see Example 1 and
Example 2). Recall that we considered the three following sentences: A = ‘She is
a pro archer’, B = ‘She missed the target at 5 yards’ and C = ‘She is a pro archer
but isn’t wearing her glasses’. We noted that, plausibly, ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B], while
A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ B], contradicting our stronger pair of principles. However, note
that, intuitively, B → ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗ C]: after finding out that she is a pro archer
who isn’t wearing her glasses, we ought not believe that if she missed the target,
then she isn’t a pro archer. Given this, neither of the weaker (β1∗) and (β2∗)
can be applied to yield the problematic consequence that, if ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B],
then A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B].
It will turn out to be useful, in the final sections of the paper, to have noted
the following equivalent formulations of (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4):




4) is equivalent to the con-
junction of the following two principles:
(γ1∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗A∨C x
(γ3∗4) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]], and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x,
then y 4Ψ∗C x.
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4) is equivalent to the conjunction of the fol-
lowing two principles:
(γ2∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x
(γ4∗4) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x,
then y ≺Ψ∗C x.
Note that, given the assumption that 4Ψ∗>=4Ψ, which follows from (C1∗4),
(γ1∗4) and (γ2
∗




4) (let C = ¬A). However,
none of these four new principles, and hence neither of (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4), are
generally sound for admissible operators:
Proposition 7. None of (γ1∗4) to (γ4
∗






8. Characterisations of POI operators
We have now identified a number of sound principles for the class of POI
revision operators, which, we would like to remind the reader, subsumes both
restrained and lexicographic operators. Next, we would like to characterise it.
8.1. Semantic characterisation
For our semantic characterisation, we need to introduce three more postu-
lates, the first two of which are respective strengthenings of (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4),
which can be recovered by setting z = y:
(α1∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z 4Ψ y and y 4Ψ∗A x, then
z 4Ψ∗C x
(α2∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z 4Ψ y and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then
z ≺Ψ∗C x
(α3∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z ≺Ψ y and y 4Ψ∗A x, then
z ≺Ψ∗C x
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It can be shown that




4) are satisfied by POI revision opera-
tors.
These principles can perhaps be viewed as qualified pseudo-‘transitivity’ prin-
ciples, if one ignores the subscripts. We note, furthermore, that:
Proposition 9. (α1∗4) and (α2
∗
4) are equivalent to the conjunctions of (β1
∗
4)
and (β2∗4), respectively, with the following semantic principles, again respec-
tively:
(β3∗4) If z 6= y, x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z 4Ψ y, and y 4Ψ∗A x,
then z 4Ψ∗C x
(β4∗4) If z 6= y, x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z 4Ψ y, and y ≺Ψ∗A x,
then z ≺Ψ∗C x
So Proposition 8 shows that (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4)–and hence, in view of Proposition
6, (γ1∗4) to (γ4
∗
4)–are sound for POI revision operators. We can now present
our main result, which is a semantic characterisation of the family:










In conjunction with the results of Booth & Meyer regarding non-prioritised POI
revision operators, Propositions 2 and 8 establish the left-to-right direction of
the above claim. For the other direction we need to show that, if ∗ satisfies the
relevant semantic properties, then there exists a non-prioritised POI revision
operator ◦ such that N(∗, ◦). The construction works as follows: From ∗, define
◦ by setting, for all x, y ∈ W , x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. Given (Eq∗4),
(C1∗4) and (C2
∗
4) this is equivalent to:
x 4Ψ◦A y iff

x 4Ψ y if x ∼A y
x 4Ψ∗¬y y if x /A y
























Figure 8: Logical relations between some of the semantic postulates discussed above.
Note that certain implications hinge on some of the Darwiche & Pearl postulates.
where (i) x EA y iff x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]], (ii) x ∼A y iff x EA y and y EA x,
(iii) x /A y iff x EA y but not y EA x.11
8.2. Two syntactic characterisations
In this part we offer two different syntactic characterisations of the family
of POI revision operators. The first involves the following postulates:
(Ω1∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then B 6∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A]
(Ω2∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A]
11Note that, while we explicitly claim that states ought to be associated with something
more fine-grained than TPO’s, namely POI assignments, the semantic principles that charac-
terize POI revision are framed in terms of relations between TPO’s. An anonymous reviewer
for this journal has suggested that some readers could find this puzzling.
But there is no tension here, much in the same way that there is no tension between char-
acterizing AGM-compliant revision operators in terms of principles that constrain relations
between belief sets, while explicitly claiming that states ought to be identified with something
more fine-grained than belief sets (e.g. TPO’s, POI assignments, etc.).
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(Ω3∗) If ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A]
These principles admit an interpretation in terms of the notions of overruling
and strict overruling that we introduced in Definition 1. Indeed, (Ω1∗) and (Ω2∗)
stipulate conditions under which the obtaining of these relations entail that of
their converses, while (Ω3∗) offers a condition that is sufficient for B’s overruling
A to entail A’s strictly overruling B. More specifically, (Ω1∗) tells us that, if A is
at least as well entrenched in the agent’s beliefs as B12 and B overrules A, then
A overrules B. (Ω2∗) tells us that, under the same entrenchment condition, the
analogous implication holds for strict overruling. Finally, (Ω3∗) translates as
the claim that, if A is strictly better entrenched than B in the agent’s beliefs13
and B overrules A, then A strictly overrules B.
Our first syntactic characterisation is then given by the following:
Proposition 10. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM, (Eq∗),
(C1∗), (C2∗), (β1∗), (β2∗), (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗).
While it employs some fairly accessible principles, this result ‘bundles’ the con-
tribution of (P∗4) into the principles (Ω1
∗)–(Ω3∗). For this reason, we offer
a second characterisation that separates out the contributions and maps each
characteristic semantic principle onto a corresponding syntactic counterpart.





are given as follows, where Y denotes exclusive disjunction (XOR):
Proposition 11. (a) Given AGM, (β3∗4) is equivalent to
12The notion of comparative entrenchment is perhaps best understood in terms of the
operation of contraction ÷: A is at least as well entrenched in the agent’s beliefs as B iff
the agent would at least give up B were he or she have to give up at least one of A or B
(B /∈ [Ψ÷ A ∧ B]). This is equivalent, given the Levi and Harper Identities, to the following
definition in terms of revision: A is at least as well entrenched in the agent’s beliefs as B iff the
agent would at least give up ¬A were he or she have to come to believe A∨B (¬A /∈ [Ψ∗A∨B]).
13A is strictly better entrenched in the agent’s beliefs than B iff A ∈ [Ψ÷A∧B]. In terms
of revision, this last condition translates into ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B].
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(β3∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 ∧A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
(b) Given AGM and (C4∗4), (β4
∗
4) is equivalent to:
(β4∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 ∧ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
(c) Given AGM and (C3∗4), (α3
∗
4) is equivalent to:
(α3∗) If ¬B2 ∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].










syntactic counterparts of (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4) were provided in Proposition 5. Parts
(a) and (b) of Proposition 11 thus allow us to infer:
Corollary 2. (a) Given AGM, (α1∗4) is equivalent to (α1
∗) := (β1∗) & (β3∗).
(b) Given AGM and (C4∗4), (α2
∗
4) is equivalent to (α2
∗) := (β2∗) & (β4∗).
Since we already have the syntactic counterpart of (P∗4), in view of Theorem 2,
part (c) of Proposition 11 completes a second syntactic characterisation of the
POI family.
Corollary 3. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM, (Eq∗), (C1∗),
(C2∗), (P∗), (α1∗), (α2∗), and (α3∗).
This one-to-one correspondence between semantic and syntactic principles, how-
ever, comes at a cost, since we note that (α1∗)–(α3∗) are clearly much harder
to interpret than (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗).
9. POI assignments, overruling and reductionism
In Subsection 2.3, we presented a recent counterexample to the identification
of states with TPO’s. It suggested that the relations of overruling, which are
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crucial to two step revision, could not be represented in a structure as simple
as a TPO. Indeed, two cases were described, involving respective states that (i)
were associated with identical TPO’s but (ii) differed as to whether a particular
pair of sentences stood in a relation of strict overruling (Example 1, in which B
strictly overruled A) or in no relation of overruling at all (Example 2, in which
B did not overrule A).
The additional expressive power of POI assignments enables us to adequately
model the contrasting situations. The states involved are plausibly associated
with the distinct POI assignments depicted in Figure 9, which remain both
faithful to the TPO depicted in Figure 1, page 10.
AB AB AB AB
Example 1: ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
AB AB AB AB
Example 2: A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
Figure 9: Representation of POI assignments respectively associated with Example
1 and Example 2, again assuming a language with atomic sentences {A,B}. Dotted
boxes enclose the minimal worlds in [[B]] after revision by A.
It is easy to see that, in the particular situation at hand, the distinction
between B’s strictly overruling A and its not overruling A is down to the fol-
lowing fact: In the POI assignment corresponding to the former case, but not
in the one corresponding to the latter, the negative counterpart of the world in
[[¬A ∧ B]] is strictly lower in the ordering than the positive counterpart of the
world in [[A∧B]]. It is therefore natural to ask how the overruling relations are
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represented in the more general case.
For non-prioritised POI revision, the situation is straightforward and was
worked out by Booth & Meyer [12]. They first defined two strict partial orders
based on the POI construction:
Definition 9. (i) x <<Ψ y if x
− ≤Ψ y+ and (ii) x <<<Ψ y if x− <Ψ y+
With this in hand they proved (see their Proposition 8): (a) A /∈ [(Ψ◦A)∗B] iff
min(<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]] and (b) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ◦A) ∗B] iff min(<<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]].
In the prioritised case, the naturalisation step complicates matters a little.
Here, the translation of the overrules relations into <<Ψ and <<<Ψ turns out to
be the following:
Proposition 12. If ∗ is a POI operator, then:
(a) A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] iff min(<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A], and
(b) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] iff min(<<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A].
As was pointed out in [12], lexicographic revision corresponds to the case in
which <<Ψ=<<<Ψ= ∅, while Papini’s reverse lexicographic revision corresponds
to the case in which <<Ψ=<<<Ψ=≺Ψ. Thus, from the above result we see that,
for both lexicographic and restrained operators, the overrules and strictly over-
rules relations collapse into the same relation. Furthermore, for lexicographic
revision, we have that B overrules A iff A ∧ B is inconsistent (cf. the postu-
late (Rec∗) in Theorem 1), while, for restrained revision, B overrules A iff both
¬A ∈ [Ψ∗B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ∗A] (i.e., iff A and B counteract, to use the terminol-
ogy from [7]). Clearly, in both cases, the overrules relation is symmetric, and
so unrestricted versions of (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗) hold for these two sets of operators.
10. Iterated versions of AGM era postulates
In this final section of the paper, we investigate various further properties of
POI revision operators, discussing in the process an interesting issue that has
somewhat been neglected in the literature: the extension, to the iterated case,
of the various AGM era postulates for revision.
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10.1. Some postulates that are sound
In Section 7, we briefly noted that (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4) could each be reformu-
lated as the conjunction of a pair of principles ((γ1∗4) and (γ3
∗
4), regarding the
former, and (γ2∗4) and (γ4
∗
4), regarding the latter). We showed that these prin-
ciples, which had not been discussed in the literature to date, are not generally
satisfied by admissible revision operators. It turns out, furthermore, that they
are particularly noteworthy, since we can show that, in various combinations,
they enable us to recover iterated generalisations of the following strong AGM
postulates for revision and related well-known principles:
(K7∗) [Ψ ∗A ∧ C] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {C})
(DR∗) [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A] ∪ [Ψ ∗ C]
(DO∗) [Ψ ∗A] ∩ [Ψ ∗ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C]
(DI∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]
(K7∗), which was introduced in Section 2, is one of the two ‘supplementary’
AGM postulates and is also known as ‘Superexpansion’. ‘DR’, ‘DO’ and ‘DI’
respectively abbreviate ‘Disjunctive Rationality’, ‘Disjunctive Overlap’ and ‘Dis-
junctive Inclusion’. As is well known in the literature, given the other AGM pos-
tulates, (DR∗) is a consequence of the second supplementary postulate (K8∗),
aka ‘Subexpansion’, while (DO∗) is equivalent to (K7∗) and (DI∗) to (K8∗),
which was also introduced in Section 2.
The iterated generalisations that we recover are obtained by replacing all
mentions of the belief states in the principles above by that of their correspond-
ing revisions by a common sentence B and making some minor adjustments. In
each case, assuming Success and [Ψ ∗ >] = [Ψ], setting B = > enables us to
recover the non-iterated counterpart. We have:
(iK7∗) [(Ψ ∗A ∧ C) ∗B] ⊆ Cn([(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ {A ∧ C})
(iDR∗) [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(iDO∗) [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B]
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(iDI∗) If ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
Although (iK7∗) and (iDI∗) are, to the best of our knowledge, new to the liter-
ature, we note that (iDR∗) and (iDO∗) were already discussed and endorsed by
Schlechta et al [20]. Our results are the following.





(γ4∗4) jointly entail (iDO
∗) and (b) (γ2∗4) and (γ3
∗
4) jointly entail (iDR
∗).
Proposition 14. Given AGM and (C1∗4), (a) (γ1
∗
4) is equivalent to (iDI
∗) and
(b) (γ2∗4) is equivalent to (iK7
∗).
10.2. Some postulates that are not sound
We have not recovered the iterated version of Subexpansion, aka (K8∗),
whose formulation we recall here
(K8∗) If ¬C /∈ [Ψ ∗A], then Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {C}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∧ C]
and which is given by:
(iK8∗) If ¬(A ∧ C) /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then Cn([(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ {A ∧ C})
⊆ [(Ψ ∗A ∧ C) ∗B]
For this, we consider the following rather strong principle:
(sP∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
This principle strengthens the conjunction of (γ1∗4) and (γ2
∗
4) in much the





recall, are respective weakenings of (γ1∗4) and (γ2
∗
4)). Taken contrapositively,
the principle inherits the weak antecedent of (γ1∗4) but the strong consequent




4) is recovered as the
special case of (sP∗4) in which C = ¬A. We now note:




Where does our POI family stand with respect to this principle? Well, we can
establish the following:
Proposition 16. (sP∗4) is satisfied by both lexicographic and restrained revision
operators.
Since lexicographic and restrained revision operators satisfy (sγ1∗4), this estab-
lishes, that they satisfy (iK8∗). This is interesting, since it shows, not only
that the principle is consistent with our previous constraints, but that adding
it to these does not yield the kind of ‘reductionism’ that has been argued to be
objectionable. However, it remains the case that
Proposition 17. (sP∗4) is not generally satisfied by POI revision operators.
In fact, a weaker property than this one fails to hold across the family. Indeed,
(sP∗4) generalises the following Separation property, discussed by Booth & Meyer
[7] under the name of ‘UR’, which is the special case of (sP∗4) in which C = A:
(Sep∗4) If x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y or y ≺Ψ∗A x
This condition can be captured by a ‘Non-Flush’ constraint on the POI assign-
ment, which states that it is never the case that two intervals line up flush, in
the sense that x+ ∼Ψ y−. This condition is not satisfied in general by POI




− ∼Ψ z+ <Ψ z−. Non-Flush fails, with the result
that so too does (Sep∗4) and hence (sP
∗
4), since y ∼Ψ∗x∨z z. This establishes
Proposition 17.
At this point, a natural question arises: Why has the narrower family of POI
revision operators satisfying (Sep∗4), or indeed, (sP
∗
4), not made a more central
appearance in the present paper? The answer to this is that (Sep∗4) remains in
our view an extremely strong property. This becomes most apparent when one
considers its syntactic counterpart:
(Sep∗) Either ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] or A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
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This principle states that, once one has revised one’s beliefs by a certain sen-
tence, one will remain opinionated as to whether or not that sentence is true
upon any further single revision. But this seems too strong: let A be any sen-
tence and B be the sentence ‘The Oracle says that it might not be the case that
A’. Plausibly A,¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B].
Also of interest is the iterated version of ‘Disjunctive Factoring’, which is
equivalent to the conjunction of (K7∗) and (K8∗), in the presence of the other
AGM postulates:14
(DF∗) (i) If ¬C ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗A]
(ii) If ¬A,¬C /∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗A] ∩ [Ψ ∗ C]
(iii) If ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗ C]
The iterated version is given by:
(iDF∗) (i) If ¬C ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B]
= [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
(ii) If ¬A,¬C /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B]
= [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∩[(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(iii) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B]
= [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(iDF∗)(ii) is entailed by the combination of (iDO∗), for the right-to-left direc-
tion, and (iDI∗), for the left-to-right direction, both of which we have established
to be sound for POI revision operators. Regarding (iDF∗)(i) (a similar result
holding, by symmetry, for (iDF∗)(iii)):
Proposition 18. The semantic counterparts of the right-to-left and left-to-right
directions of (iDF∗)(i) are respectively:
14This condition is typically stated in weaker terms, as: [Ψ∗A∨C] is equal to either [Ψ∗A],
[Ψ∗C], or [Ψ∗A]∩ [Ψ∗C]. However, the equivalence that is proven is in fact with the stronger
principle. See [29, Proposition 3.16], where the proof is credited to Hans Rott.
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(γ5∗4) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
(γ6∗4) If y ∈ [[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x.
We note that (γ6∗4), in conjunction with (γ2
∗
4), obviously gives us (sβ2
∗
4). How-
ever, due to the requirement that x ∈ [[¬A]] in the antecedent of (γ5∗4), the latter
does not give us (sβ1∗4), in conjunction with (γ1
∗
4).
Where do these principles stand in relation to our family of operators? The
answer is the following:
Proposition 19. Neither (γ5∗4) nor (γ6
∗
4) are generally satisfied by POI revi-
sion operators.
However:
Proposition 20. Both (γ5∗4) and (γ6
∗
4) are satisfied by lexicographic revision
operators.
This establishes that (iDF∗) is satisfied by lexicographic revision operators, since
we have individually shown that they satisfy all the component principles.
The relations between the semantic and syntactic versions of the postulates
discussed in this section are summarised in Figure 10.
11. Conclusions and further work
This paper has investigated a significant, yet comparatively restrained,
strengthening of the seminal framework introduced two decades ago by Dar-
wiche and Pearl. Unlike the majority of existing models of iterated revision,
the proposal falls short of identifying belief states with simple total preorders
over worlds. Indeed, it incorporates further structure into these, in the form
of proper ordinal intervals.15 This is achieved by combining Booth & Meyer’s
15We are not the only ones to have proposed an enrichment of belief states beyond mere


















Figure 10: Relations between the semantic and syntactic versions of the iterated
AGM-era postulates discussed. The dashed box encloses those postulates that are
sound for POI operators. The dotted box encloses those that are sound for both lexi-
cographic and restrained revision operators. All postulates are sound for lexicographic
revision operators. Note that certain of the implications only hold given one or more
of (C1∗4) and (C2
∗
4).
framework for non-prioritised revision with a ‘naturalisation’ step, in a move
that bears some similarities to the definition, via the Levi Identity, of single-
step revision as a contraction followed by an expansion. The resulting family of
POI revision operators, which is a sub-family of the so-called ‘admissible’ fam-
ily, has been characterised both semantically and syntactically. It has also been
shown that POI revision operators are distinctive, within the class of admissible
ones, in satisfying iterated counterparts of many (albeit not all) classic AGM
era postulates.
states with ‘ranking functions’, aka ‘OCFs’ [30, 31]. However, Spohn does not acknowledge
the concept of revision simpliciter that we are studying. Rather, he considers a parameterised
family of revision-like functions. This additional parameter very much complicates the trans-
lation of our principles into his framework. In a rather different vein, Konieczny & Pérez
[32] identify states with histories of input sentences (see also [33] and [34] for related work).
However, it turns out that if (C2∗)–a feature of POI revision–is imposed, then the class of
operators that they study narrows down to lexicographic revision alone.
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In future work, we first plan to consider the consequences of relaxing (P∗).
This condition fails for a more general family of what one could call ‘basic ordi-
nal interval (BOI)’ revision operators. These operators, which include natural
revision operators, are naturalisations of non-prioritised operators based on or-
dinal interval assignments that satisfy, not (≤ 2), but the weaker requirement
that x+ ≤ x−. As it turns out, our proof of the soundness of (α1∗4)–(α3∗4) with
respect to POI operators carries over here, leaving us in a strong position to
provide a characterisation for this more general family.
Secondly, as Figure 4 reminds us, the constraints that we have discussed
impose few constraints on the result of more than two iterations of the revision
operation. While the structure associated with belief states currently determines
the posterior TPO, nothing has been said regarding the nature of the posterior
POI assignment. One possible question to investigate in relation to this would be
that of the extent to which the DP postulates, and the new principles introduced
here, could be adapted to the relations << and <<< introduced in Definition 9.
Finally, we have not provided a discussion of any complexity considerations.
Relevant problems whose computational difficulty one might want to to consider
include the so-called ‘inference’ problem of deciding, for a given state Ψ and
sentences A,B and C, whether or not C ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], where ∗ is a POI
revision operator.16
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Appendix A: A sample ‘concrete’ POI revision operator
We use an idea from Booth & Meyer [12], that bears some superficial simi-
larities to Spohn’s ranking theory [30, 31]. We identify the set of possible belief
states with the set of all functions p : W → R. For each p, we have an associated
TPO 4p over W , given by setting x 4p y iff p(x) ≤ p(y). For each sentence
B ∈ L we define p(B) = min{p(y) | y ∈ [[B]]}.
We have a parameter a > 0 as fixed and given. Then each p can be extended
to a function on signed worlds by setting, for each x ∈ W , p(x+) = p(x) and
p(x−) = p(x)+a, which yields a POI assignment≤p given by xε ≤p yδ iff p(xε) ≤
p(yδ). In other words, we assign to each x the real interval (p(x), p(x) + a).
We define the revision p ∗a,b A of p by A as a composition of two operators
◦a and ⊕b, i.e., p ∗a,b A = (p ◦a A) ⊕b A. The first ◦a is a non-prioritised
revision, as defined previously, and the second ⊕b is a natural revision operator,
parameterised by some fixed b > 0. More precisely, p ◦a A is given by setting,
for each x ∈W ,
[p ◦a A](x) =

p(x) if x ∈ [[A]]
p(x) + a if x ∈ [[¬A]]
In other words, all countermodels of the new information get their p-value in-
creased by a. Note that the interval associated to x will stay unchanged if
x ∈ [[A]], while if x ∈ [[¬A]] then the whole interval gets shifted by amount a to
(p(x) + a, p(x) + 2a).




p(>)− b if x ∈ min(4p, [[A]])
p(x) otherwise
We provide an example of ∗a,b in action (assuming a = b = 2) in Figure 11.
We know that ◦a is a non-prioritised POI revision operator from [12] and it is
easy to see that N(∗a,b, ◦a). Thus, ∗a,b so defined is a POI revision operator and
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Figure 11: Interval representation of the revision of a state by A, with parameters
a = b = 2. The lower endpoint of each interval indicates the p-value p(x) of a given
world x and its upper endpoint the value p(x) + a = p(x) + 2.
satisfies all the relevant postulates discussed in the previous sections.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proposition 1. N(∗, ◦) iff, for all A ∈ L, 4Ψ∗A minimises the symmetric dif-
ference distance dS to 4Ψ◦A, subject to the constraints of AGM.
Proof: Let ∗ satisfy AGM. Then, we will have min(4Ψ∗A,W ) = min(4Ψ, [[A]]).
We also know that min(4Ψ, [[A]]) = min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]). Indeed, since (i) for all
x ∈ [[A]], rA(x) = x+, (ii) x+ ≤Ψ y+ iff x 4Ψ y, and (iii) x 4Ψ◦A y iff rA(x) ≤Ψ
rA(y), we have, for all x, y ∈ [[A]], x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ y. Hence min(4Ψ∗A,W ) =
min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]). By the definition of natural revision, x 4(Ψ◦A)A y iff: (i)
x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ◦A y. From this we
can then conclude, as required, that 4Ψ∗A minimises the symmetric difference
distance dS to 4Ψ◦A iff it is equal to 4(Ψ◦A)A, i.e. iff N(∗, ◦). 
Proposition 2. For any functions ◦ and ∗ from state-sentence pairs to states,









Proof: Recall that N(∗, ◦) iff: x 4Ψ∗A y iff either (i) x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ◦A y.
(i) Preservation of (C1∗4): Assume that x, y ∈ [[A]] and that x 4Ψ◦A y
iff x 4Ψ y. We show that x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y.
From x 4Ψ∗A y to x 4Ψ◦A y: Trivial.
From x 4Ψ◦A y to x 4Ψ∗A y: Assume x 4Ψ◦A y. We just need to show
that, if x /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), then y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]). This follows
immediately from x 4Ψ◦A y and x ∈ [[A]].
(ii) Preservation of (C2∗4): Assume that x, y ∈ [[A]] and that x 4Ψ◦A y
iff x 4Ψ y. We show that x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y.
From x 4Ψ∗A y to x 4Ψ◦A y: Trivial.
From x 4Ψ◦A y to x 4Ψ∗A y: Assume x 4Ψ◦A y. We just need to show
that, if x /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), then y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]). This follows
immediately from y ∈ [[¬A]].
(iii) Preservation of (P∗4): Assume that x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and that, if
x 4Ψ y then x ≺Ψ◦A y. We show that, if x ≺Ψ◦A y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y.
From the definition of naturalisation, we have: if N(∗, ◦), then x ≺Ψ∗A
y iff either (i) x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or (ii)
x, y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x ≺Ψ◦A y. So, given x ≺Ψ◦A y, we just
need to show that, if x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), then y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]).
This follows immediately from y ∈ [[¬A]].
(iv) Preservation of (Eq∗4): Assume A ≡ B. We want to show
4Ψ∗A=4Ψ∗B . So assume for contradiction that there exist x and y
such that x 4Ψ∗A y but y ≺Ψ∗B x (the other case is analogous).
From x 4Ψ∗A y we have: (1) x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or (2) x, y /∈
min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ◦A y.
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From y ≺Ψ∗A x, we obtain: (3) y ∈ min(4Ψ◦B , [[B]]) and x /∈ min(4Ψ◦B
, [[B]]), or (4) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ◦B , [[B]]) and y ≺Ψ◦B y.
From A ≡ B and the fact that ◦ satisfies (Eq∗4), we have 4Ψ◦A=4Ψ◦B
and [[A]] = [[B]]. Given this, it is easy to see that neither (1) nor (2) is
consistent with either (3) or (4). 
Proposition 4. Let Ψ and Ψ′ be two belief states and ∗ a POI revision operator.
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) ∀A ∈ L,4Ψ∗A=4Ψ′∗A
(2) (a) 4Ψ′=4Ψ=4, and (b) ≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ agree on {x−, y+} for all
x, y ∈W such that
(i) x ≺ y and
(ii) there exists z ∈W such that z 6= x and z ≺ y.
Proof: For the proof, we shall use the syntactic counterpart of (1), namely:
∀A,B ∈ L, [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B)]. We note, in relation to part (b),
that Proposition 2 above entitles us to help ourselves to the postulates (C1∗4)
to (C4∗4).
(a) Left-to-right direction: We prove the contrapositive, deriving, from
the negation of (2), the claim that there exist A,B ∈ L such that
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] 6= [(Ψ′ ∗A) ∗B)].
So assume that either (a) 4Ψ′ 6=4Ψ or (b) 4Ψ′=4Ψ=4 and there exist
x, y ∈ W such that (i) x ≺ y, (ii) there exists z ∈ W such that z 6= x
and z ≺ y, and (iii) ≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ disagree on {x−, y+}.
If (a), then it is easy to see that there exists A ∈ L such that [Ψ ∗A] 6=
[Ψ′ ∗A]. Hence [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ >] 6= [(Ψ′ ∗A) ∗ >)] and we are done.
So assume (b). Consider now the three possibilities regarding the man-
ner in which ≤Ψ relates x− and y+: (1) x− <Ψ y+, (2) x− =̇Ψ y+ (i.e.,
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both x− ≤Ψ y+ and y+ ≤Ψ x−) and (3) y+ <Ψ x−. Given (i) and (ii),
each of these cases will yield a different result for a revision of the belief
state by y ∨ z and then by x ∨ y, namely:
(1) x ∈ [(Ψ ∗ y ∨ z) ∗ x ∨ y]
(2) x, y /∈ [(Ψ ∗ y ∨ z) ∗ x ∨ y]
(3) y ∈ [(Ψ ∗ y ∨ z) ∗ x ∨ y]
This situation is analogous for ≤Ψ′ . Hence any disagreement between
≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ on {x−, y+}, will yield a difference in outcomes after re-
vision of Ψ and Ψ′, respectively, by y ∨ z and then by x ∨ y.
(b) Right-to-left direction: Assume that, for some A,B ∈ L, [(Ψ ∗A) ∗
B] 6= [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B)], i.e. min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) 6= min(4Ψ′∗A, [[B]]). We will
show that, if (a) 4Ψ′=4Ψ=4, then (b) there exist x, y ∈ W such that
(i) x ≺ y, (ii) there exists z ∈ W such that z 6= x and z ≺ y, and (iii)
≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ disagree on {x−, y+}.
Assume for definiteness that there exists y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) such that
y /∈ min(4Ψ′∗A, [[B]]) (the reasoning from the case in which y is in
the second set but not the first is analogous). Then there exists x (in
min(4Ψ′∗A, [[B]])) such that x ≺Ψ′∗A y but y 4Ψ∗A x.
Now assume that 4Ψ′=4Ψ=4. By the definition of POI assignments,
we then have x ≺Ψ′∗A y iff
(1) x ∈ min(4, [[A]]) and y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(2) x, y /∈ min(4, [[A]]) and rA(x) <Ψ′ rA(y)
as well as y 4Ψ∗A x iff
(3) y ∈ min(4, [[A]]), or
(4) x, y /∈ min(4, [[A]]) and rA(y) ≤Ψ rA(x)
But (1) is inconsistent with both (3) and (4) and (3) is inconsistent
with (2). This means that we must have (2) and (4).
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Since x ≺Ψ′∗A y but y 4Ψ∗A x, by (C1∗4) and (C2∗4), x and y can’t
both be in [[A]] or both be in [[¬A]].
So assume x ∈ [[¬A]] and y ∈ [[A]]. By (C4∗4) and x ≺Ψ′∗A y, we then
have x ≺ y. Given our assumption, rA(y) = y+ and rA(x) = x−.
So by (2), we have x− <Ψ′ y
+ and by (4), we have y+ ≤Ψ x−. So
≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ disagree on {x−, y+}. We simply now need to establish
that there exists z 6= x such that z ≺ y. We know that, although
y ∈ [[A]], y /∈ min(4, [[A]]). So there exists z ∈ [[A]], such that z ≺ y.
Furthermore, since z ∈ [[A]] but x ∈ [[¬A]], z 6= x.
Assume then that x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]]. Given our assumption,
rA(y) = y
− and rA(x) = x
+. So by (2), we have x+ <Ψ′ y
− and
by (4), we have y− ≤Ψ x+. So ≤Ψ′ and ≤Ψ disagree on {x−, y+}.
Furthermore, since by definition, y+ <Ψ y
−, it follows from y− ≤Ψ x+
that y+ <Ψ x
+ and therefore y ≺ x. We simply now need to establish
that there exists z 6= y such that z ≺ x. We know that, although
x ∈ [[A]], x /∈ min(4, [[A]]). So there exists z ∈ [[A]], such that z ≺ x.
Furthermore, since z ∈ [[A]] but y ∈ [[¬A]], z 6= y. 
Proposition 5. (a) Given AGM, (β1∗4) is equivalent to:
(β1∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(b) Given AGM, (β2∗4) is equivalent to:
(β2∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
Proof:
(a) (i) From (β1∗4) to (β1
∗): Assume A /∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B], B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ∗C]
and, for contradiction, A ∈ [(Ψ ∗C) ∗B]. From A ∈ [(Ψ ∗C) ∗B],
it follows that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B]]) ⊆ [[A]]. Now consider an arbitrary
x ∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B]]). Since x ∈ [[A∧B]], it follows from ¬(A∧B) ∈
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[Ψ∗C] and Success that x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). From A /∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B],
there exists y such that y ∈ [[¬A]] ∩ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). Given x ∈
[[B]], we furthermore have y 4Ψ∗A x. By (β1∗4), we then recover
y 4Ψ∗C x. Since y ∈ [[B]], x ∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B]]) and y ∈ [[¬A]], this
contradicts min(4Ψ∗C , [[B]]) ⊆ [[A]]. Hence A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ B], as
required.
(ii) From (β1∗) to (β1∗4): Assume x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈
[[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x. Assume for contradiction that ¬(A∧(x∨y)) /∈
[Ψ ∗C]. Then there exists w in min(4Ψ, [[C]])∩ [[A∧ (x∨ y)]]. But
[[A ∧ (x ∨ y)]] = {x}, since x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], and we have
assumed x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). Contradiction. So ¬(A ∧ (x ∨ y)) ∈
[Ψ ∗ C]. From y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, it follows that A /∈
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ x ∨ y]. By (β1∗), we then recover A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ x ∨ y]
and hence, since x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], y 4Ψ∗C x, as required.
(b) (i) From (β2∗4) to (β2
∗): Assume ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], B → ¬A ∈
[Ψ∗C] and, for contradiction, ¬A /∈ [(Ψ∗C)∗B]. From ¬A /∈ [(Ψ∗
C) ∗B], there exists x such that x ∈ [[A]]∩min(4Ψ∗C , [[B]]). Since
x ∈ [[A ∧B]], it follows from ¬(A ∧B) ∈ [Ψ ∗ C] and Success that
x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). From ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B], there exists y such that
y ∈ [[¬A]] ∩min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). Given x ∈ [[B]], we furthermore have
y ≺Ψ∗A x. By (β2∗4), we then recover y ≺Ψ∗C x. Since y ∈ [[B]],
this contradicts x ∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B]]). Hence ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ B],
as required.
(ii) From (β2∗) to (β2∗4): Assume x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈
[[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x. Assume for contradiction that ¬(A∧(x∨y)) /∈
[Ψ ∗C]. Then there exists w in min(4Ψ, [[C]])∩ [[A∧ (x∨ y)]]. But
[[A ∧ (x ∨ y)]] = {x}, since x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], and we have
assumed x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). Contradiction. So ¬(A ∧ (x ∨ y)) ∈
[Ψ ∗ C]. From y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, it follows that ¬A ∈
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗ x∨ y]. By (β2∗), we then recover ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗C) ∗ x∨ y]
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and hence, since x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], y ≺Ψ∗C x, as required. 




4) is equivalent to the con-
junction of the following two principles:
(γ1∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗A∨C x
(γ3∗4) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]], and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x,
then y 4Ψ∗C x.




4) is equivalent to the conjunction of the fol-
lowing two principles:
(γ2∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x
(γ4∗4) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x,
then y ≺Ψ∗C x.
Proof:










(1) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[C]] and
y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
Indeed, from x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[C]] ⊆ [[A ∨ C]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x,
(C2∗4) gives us y 4Ψ x. Given y ∈ [[C]], if we assume x ∈ [[C]], then
y 4Ψ∗C x follows from (C2∗4). If we assume instead that x ∈ [[¬C]],
the same conclusion follows from (C4∗4). The conjunction of (γ3
∗
4)
and (1) then gives us:
(2) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬A ∨ C]] and
y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
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We now show that (2) and (γ1∗4) entail (β1
∗
4): Assume x ∈ [[A]],
y ∈ [[¬A]], x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]) and y 4Ψ∗A x. From x ∈ [[A]], y ∈
[[¬A]], and y 4Ψ∗A x, (γ1∗4) gives us y 4Ψ∗A∨C x. From x ∈ [[A]]
and y ∈ [[¬A]], we recover x ∈ [[A ∨ C]] and y ∈ [[¬A ∨ C]]. From
x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬A ∨ C]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x,
(2) gives us y 4Ψ∗C x, as required.









simply substitute A ∨ C for A in (β1∗4). To get from (β1∗4) to
(γ1∗4), assume x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x. From y 4Ψ∗A x
and y ∈ [[¬A]], it follows by Success that x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and
hence by x ∈ [[A]] that x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ C]]). By (β1∗4), we then
recover y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, as required.










(1) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[C]] and
y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
Indeed, from x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[C]] ⊆ [[A ∨ C]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x,
(C1∗4) gives us y ≺Ψ x. Given y ∈ [[C]], if we assume x ∈ [[C]],
then y ≺Ψ∗C x follows from (C1∗4). If we assume instead that x ∈
[[¬C]], the same conclusion follows from (C3∗4). The conjunction
of (γ4∗4) and (1) then gives us:
(2) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬A ∨ C]] and
y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
We now show that (2) and (γ2∗4) entail (β2
∗
4): Assume x ∈ [[A]],
y ∈ [[¬A]], x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]) and y ≺Ψ∗A x. From x ∈ [[A]], y ∈
[[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A x, (γ2∗4) gives us y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x. From x ∈ [[A]]
and y ∈ [[¬A]], we recover x ∈ [[A ∨ C]] and y ∈ [[¬A ∨ C]]. From
x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]], y ∈ [[¬A ∨ C]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x,
(2) gives us y ≺Ψ∗C x, as required.
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from (β2∗4) to (γ4
∗
4), simply substitute A ∨ C for A in (β2∗4). To
get from (β2∗4) to (γ2
∗
4), assume x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x.
From y ≺Ψ∗A x, it follows by Success that x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and
hence by x ∈ [[A]] that x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ C]]). By (β2∗4), we then
recover y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, as required. 
Proposition 7. None of (γ1∗4) to (γ4
∗







(a) Regarding (γ1∗4) and (γ2
∗
4): Consider the countermodel below. It is




4) are all satisfied. However,
both (γ1∗4) and (γ2
∗
4) are violated, since [[¬A ∧ ¬C]] ≺Ψ∗A [[A ∧ ¬C]]
but [[A ∧ ¬C]] ≺Ψ∗A∨C [[¬A ∧ ¬C]].












(b) Regarding (γ3∗4) and (γ4
∗
4): Consider the countermodel below. It is




4) are all satisfied. However,
both (γ3∗4) and (γ4
∗
4) are violated, since, although [[¬A∧C]] /∈ min(4Ψ




















4) are satisfied by POI revision opera-
tors.
Proof: We first note that, for POI operators, y ≺Ψ∗A x iff
(1) y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and rA(y) <Ψ rA(x)
We also have z ≺Ψ∗C x iff either
(3) z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]) and x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), or
(4) z, x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]) and rC(z) <Ψ rC(x)
as well as y 4Ψ∗A x iff
(5) y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(6) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and rA(y) ≤Ψ rA(x)
and finally z 4Ψ∗C x iff either
(7) z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), or
(8) z, x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]) and rC(z) ≤Ψ rC(x)
With this in hand, we prove the soundness of each principle in turn:
(a) Regarding (α1∗4): Assume x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z 4Ψ y and y 4Ψ∗A x. Since y ∈ [[¬A]], we have y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]),
placing us in case (6). So rA(y) ≤Ψ rA(x). Since x ∈ [[A]], we have
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rA(x) = x
+ and, since y ∈ [[¬A]], it follows that rA(y) = y−. So
y− ≤Ψ x+. Furthermore, since z 4Ψ y, we have z− ≤Ψ y−. Hence
z− ≤Ψ x+. Since z+ ≤Ψ z− and x+ ≤Ψ x−, it then follows that
rC(z) ≤Ψ rC(x). Since we have also assumed x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), if
z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), we are in case (7) and if z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), we are
in case (8). Either way, we have z 4Ψ∗C x, as required.
(b) Regarding (α2∗4): Assume x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z 4Ψ y and y ≺Ψ∗A x. Since y ∈ [[¬A]], we have y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]),
placing us in case (2). So rA(y) <Ψ rA(x). Since x ∈ [[A]], we have
rA(x) = x
+ and, since y ∈ [[¬A]], it follows that rA(y) = y−. So
y− <Ψ x
+. Furthermore, since z 4Ψ y, we have z− ≤Ψ y−. Hence
z− <Ψ x
+. Since z+ ≤Ψ z− and x+ ≤Ψ x−, it then follows that
rC(z) <Ψ rC(x). Since we have also assumed x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), if
z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), we are in case (3) and if z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), we are
in case (4). Either way, we have z ≺Ψ∗C x, as required.
(c) Regarding (α3∗4): Assume x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z ≺Ψ y and y 4Ψ∗A x. Since y ∈ [[¬A]], we have y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]),
placing us in case (6). So rA(y) ≤Ψ rA(x). Since x ∈ [[A]], we have
rA(x) = x
+ and, since y ∈ [[¬A]], it follows that rA(y) = y−. So
y− ≤Ψ x+. Furthermore, since z ≺Ψ y, we have z− <Ψ y−. Hence
z− <Ψ x
+. Since z+ ≤Ψ z− and x+ ≤Ψ x−, it then follows that
rC(z) <Ψ rC(x). Since we have also assumed x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), if
z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), we are in case (3) and if z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), we are
in case (4). Either way, we have z ≺Ψ∗C x, as required. 










Proof: In conjunction with the results of Booth & Meyer regarding non-
prioritised POI revision operators, Propositions 2 and 8 establish the left-to-
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right direction of the claim. We simply need to establish the other direction.
Recall that, by Definition 7, we need to show that, if ∗ satisfies the relevant
semantic properties, then there exists a non-prioritised POI revision operator ◦
such that N(∗, ◦).
The construction works as follows: From each ∗ we can construct ◦ by
setting, for all x, y ∈W :
x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y




4) this is equivalent to:
x 4Ψ◦A y iff

x 4Ψ y if x ∼A y
x 4Ψ∗¬y y if x /A y
x 4Ψ∗¬x y if y /A x
where (i) x EA y iff x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]], (ii) x ∼A y when x EA y and y EA x,
and (iii) x /A y when x EA y but not y EA x.
We will establish the result by proving two main lemmas: first, we will show
that ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator (Lemma 1) and then we will
show that N(∗, ◦) (Lemma 3).
Lemma 1. ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator
We show that ◦ satisfies each of (C1◦4), (C2◦4), (P◦4), (sβ1◦4) and (sβ2◦4), as well
as the requirement that 4Ψ◦A is a TPO over W . Before doing so, however, we
first establish the following useful auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2. Let x, y, z be distinct worlds such that y 4Ψ z. Then the following
are equivalent:
(i) If x 4Ψ∗¬y y, then x 4Ψ∗¬z z
(ii) If x 4Ψ∗x∨z y, then x 4Ψ∗x∨y z
The proof of Lemma 2 is as follows:
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(a) From (i) to (ii): Suppose z ≺Ψ∗x∨z x. Then by (γ2∗4) and (Eq
∗
4), we
have z ≺Ψ∗¬z x. Hence y ≺Ψ∗¬y x, by (i). From z ≺Ψ∗¬z x we also
know that z ≺Ψ x by (C3∗4). Hence x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]) and so, from
y ≺Ψ∗¬y x, we can conclude y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x by (β2∗4).
(b) From (ii) to (i): Suppose z 4Ψ∗¬z x. Then z 4Ψ x by (C3∗4), so, since
we can also assume y 4Ψ z, x 4Ψ z and therefore x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[x∨y]]).
Then, from this and z ≺Ψ∗¬z x, we obtain z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x by postulate
(β2∗4). Hence from (ii), y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x and then y ≺Ψ∗¬y x by (γ2∗4) and
(Eq∗4).
We now return to the proof of Lemma 1.
(a) Regarding 4Ψ◦A’s being a TPO over W : We have x 4Ψ◦A y ⇔
x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. So completeness of 4Ψ◦A follows from completeness
of 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) and (Eq
∗
4). To show that 4Ψ◦A is transitive (i.e. that,
if x 4Ψ◦A y and y 4Ψ◦A z, then x 4Ψ◦A z), we go through the 8 cases
according to whether each of x, y, and z is in [[A]] or not:
(i) x, y, z ∈ [[A]] or x, y, z ∈ [[¬A]]: Follows from transitivity for
∗.
(ii) x, y ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if x 4Ψ y and
y 4Ψ∗¬z z, then x 4Ψ∗¬z z. Since x, y ∈ [[A]] and z ∈ [[¬A]],
we know that x 6= z and y 6= z. Then from x 4Ψ y and (C1∗4),
we obtain x 4Ψ∗¬z y. From the latter and y 4Ψ∗¬z z, we then
obtain x 4Ψ∗¬z z by transitivity for ∗.
(iii) x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if
x 4Ψ∗¬y y and y 4Ψ∗¬y z, then x 4Ψ z. By transitivity for
∗, it follows, from x 4Ψ∗¬y y and y 4Ψ∗¬y z, that x 4Ψ∗¬y z.
From x, z ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], we know x 6= y and z 6= y. So
from x 4Ψ∗¬y z and (C1∗4), we obtain x 4Ψ z.
(iv) x ∈ [[A]], y, z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if x 4Ψ∗¬y y
and y 4Ψ z, then x 4Ψ∗¬z z. If z = y, then x 4Ψ∗¬z z follows
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immediately from x 4Ψ∗¬y y. So we may assume z 6= y. By
Lemma 2, what we must establish is then equivalent to: if
x 4Ψ∗x∨z y and y 4Ψ z, then x 4Ψ∗x∨y z. Or contraposing:
if z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x and y 4Ψ z, then y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x. So assume
z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x and y 4Ψ z. Now, if x 4Ψ z, then x 4Ψ∗x∨y z by
(C3∗4). So assume z ≺Ψ x. We therefore have: x ∈ [[x ∨ y]],
z /∈ [[x ∨ y]], z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x, y 4Ψ z and x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]).
From this, by (α2∗4), we can then infer that y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x, as
required.
(v) x ∈ [[¬A]], y, z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if x 4Ψ∗¬x y
and y 4Ψ z, then x 4Ψ∗¬x z. Since x ∈ [[¬A]] and y, z ∈ [[A]],
we know that x 6= y and x 6= z. Hence from y 4Ψ z, we
know y 4Ψ∗¬x z. The desired implication then follows from
transitivity for ∗.
(vi) x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if
x 4Ψ∗¬x y and y 4Ψ∗¬z z, then x 4Ψ z, or, equivalently,
that, if x 4Ψ∗¬x y and z ≺Ψ x, then z ≺Ψ∗¬z y. So suppose
x 4Ψ∗¬x y and z ≺Ψ x. If y 4Ψ x, then by (P∗4) we would have
y ≺Ψ∗¬x x: contradiction. Hence we may assume x ≺Ψ y.
From this and z ≺Ψ x we have, by transitivity, z ≺Ψ y and
hence y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[y ∨ z]]). From this and x 4Ψ∗¬x y, using
postulate (β1∗4), we can deduce x 4Ψ∗y∨z y. We therefore
have: y ∈ [[y ∨ z]], x /∈ [[y ∨ z]], x 4Ψ∗y∨z y, z ≺Ψ x and
y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[x ∨ y]]). From this, by (α3∗4), we can then infer
that z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x, and so z ≺Ψ∗¬z y, by (γ2∗4), as required.
(vii) x, y ∈ [[¬A]], z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if x 4Ψ y
and y 4Ψ∗¬y z, then x 4Ψ∗¬x z. If x = y, then this holds
immediately, so we may assume x 6= y. Now suppose x 4Ψ
y and y 4Ψ∗¬y z. If z 4Ψ y, then z ≺Ψ∗¬y y by (P∗4):
contradiction. So we may assume y ≺Ψ z. From this and
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x 4Ψ y, we know, by transitivity, that x ≺Ψ z, so z /∈ min(4Ψ
, [[x∨ z]]). It then follows that y 4Ψ∗x∨z z by postulate (β1∗4).
We therefore have: z ∈ [[x ∨ z]], y /∈ [[x ∨ z]], y 4Ψ∗x∨z z,
x ≺Ψ y and z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[y ∨ z]]). From this, by (α1∗4), we
can then infer that x ≺Ψ∗y∨z z, and so x 4Ψ∗¬x z, by (γ1∗4),
as required.
(b) Regarding (C1◦4) & (C2
◦
4): we have already noted towards the be-
ginning of the proof that x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ y, whenever x ∼A y.
(c) Regarding (P◦4): Suppose x /
A y and x 4Ψ y. We must show that
x 4Ψ◦A y and y Ψ◦A x. For this, it suffices to show that x 4Ψ∗¬y y
and y Ψ∗¬y x, i.e. that x ≺Ψ∗¬y y. This follows from (P∗4).
(d) Regarding (sβ1◦4) & (sβ2
◦
4): Proposition 3 of [12] tells us that, if
◦ satisfies the previous properties, then (sβ1◦4) and (sβ2◦4) are jointly
equivalent to the following condition:
(IIA∗) If A and B agree on x and y, then x 4Ψ◦A y iff x 4Ψ◦B y
where, given A,B ∈ L and x, y ∈ W , A and B are said to agree on x
and y iff either (i) x /A y and x /B y, (ii) x ∼A y and x ∼B y or (iii)
y /A x and y /B x. Hence it suffices to show that ◦ satisfies (IIA∗). But
this is immediate from our characterisation of ◦ towards the beginning
of this proof:
x 4Ψ◦A y iff

x 4Ψ y if x ∼A y
x 4Ψ∗¬y y if x /A y
x 4Ψ∗¬x y if y /A x
We now prove our second main lemma:
Lemma 3. N(∗, ◦)
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We require:
x 4Ψ∗A y iff
(i) x ∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y
We can however replace this with
x 4Ψ∗A y iff
(i) x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y
since ◦ satisfies (C1◦4).
(a) Regarding the left-to-right direction: Suppose that x 4Ψ∗A y and
x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]). If y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), then y ≺Ψ∗A x, by Success:
contradiction. Hence y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]). It remains to be shown that
x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. If x ∼A y, then the conclusion follows by (C1∗4)–
(C2∗4). If y /
A x, then the conclusion follows from x 4Ψ∗A y and (γ1∗4).
Finally, if x /A y, then x ∈ [[A ∨ ¬(x ∨ y)]] and y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ ¬(x ∨ y))]].
Together with x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ∗A y, the desired conclusion
then follows by postulate (β2∗4).
(b) Regarding the right-to-left direction: If x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]),
then x 4Ψ∗A y by Success. So suppose x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and
x 4Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. We must show x 4Ψ∗A y. If x ∼A y, then the
conclusion follows by (C1∗4)–(C2
∗
4). If x /
A y, then the conclusion fol-
lows by (γ2∗4). Finally, if y /
A x, then the conclusion follows from
postulate (β1∗4). 
Proposition 12. If ∗ is a POI operator, then:
(a) A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] iff min(<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A], and
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(b) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] iff min(<<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A].
Proof: We simply provide the proof of (a), since the proof of (b) is analogous.
The derivation is similar to the one provided for Proposition 8, Part (i), of Booth
& Meyer [12]. We first note that A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] is given semantically by
min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) * [[A]] and that ¬B ∈ [Ψ∗A] is given by min(4Ψ, [[A]]) ⊆ [[¬B]].
(i) Regarding the left-to-right direction: Assume the truth of the an-
tecedent, i.e. min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) * [[A]], so that there exists y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A
, [[B]])∩ [[¬A]]. Suppose for reductio that the consequent is false, so that
either
(a) min(<<Ψ, [[B]]) * [[¬A]] or
(b) min(4Ψ, [[A]]) * [[¬B]].
Assume (a), so that there exists x ∈ min(<<Ψ, [[B]]) ∩ [[A]]. By
y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) and x ∈ [[B]], we have y 4Ψ∗A x, which, by the
definition of POI assignments, amounts to:
(1) y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and rA(y) ≤Ψ rA(x)
Since y ∈ [[¬A]], (1) is ruled out, placing us in case (2). Since x ∈ [[A]]
and y ∈ [[¬A]], rA(y) ≤Ψ rA(x) amounts to y− ≤Ψ x+, and hence
y <<Ψ x, contradicting x ∈ min(<<Ψ, [[B]]).
Assume (b), so that there exists z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) ∩ [[B]]. Then
min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) = min(4Ψ, [[A]])∩[[B]]. But, since min(4Ψ, [[A]])∩[[B]] ⊆
[[A]], we then have min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) ⊆ [[A]], directly contradicting out
initial assumption.
(ii) Regarding the right-to-left direction: Assume the antecedent, so
that:
(a) min(<<Ψ, [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬A]] and
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(b) min(4Ψ, [[A]]) ⊆ [[¬B]].
We will show that there exists y in min(<<Ψ, [[B]]), and hence in [[¬A]],
that is also in min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]), which will suffice to establish the con-
sequent. Assume then for reductio that for all y ∈ min(<<Ψ, [[B]]), we
have y /∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). So there exists x ∈ [[B]] such that, for all
y ∈ min(<<Ψ, [[B]]), x ≺Ψ∗A y. Now, by the definition of POI assign-
ments, x ≺Ψ∗A y holds iff:
(1) x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or
(2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and rA(x) <Ψ rA(y)
Given (b) and x ∈ [[B]], it follows that x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and so (1)
fails. This places us in case (2). Since y ∈ min(<<, [[B]]), by (a), we
have y ∈ [[¬A]] and so rA(x) <Ψ rA(y) gives us rA(x) <Ψ y−. From
rA(x) <Ψ rA(y), we also have x 6= y, and so x /∈ min(<<Ψ, [[B]]). So, for
some y ∈ min(<<Ψ, [[B]]), we must have y <<Ψ x, that is, y− ≤Ψ x+.
But this contradicts rA(x) <Ψ y
−.
Proposition 10. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM, (Eq∗),
(C1∗), (C2∗), (β1∗), (β2∗), (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗).
Proof:











4), and (b) (Eq
∗), (C1∗), (C2∗), (β1∗),
(β2∗), (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗).
The equivalence of (C1∗) and (C2∗) to (C1∗4) and (C2
∗
4) is well known. So
we first show that, given (P∗4), (αi
∗
4) entails (Ωi
∗), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
(i) Regarding (Ω1∗): From A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] we know there exists y ∈
[[¬A]] ∩ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). From ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B] there exists z ∈
[[A]] ∩ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ B]]). From the minimality of z we know z 4Ψ y.
If it were the case that z ∈ [[B]] then y 4Ψ∗A z by the minimality of y
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and so we must have y ≺Ψ z by (P∗4)–contradicting the minimality of z.
Hence z ∈ [[¬B]]. Now assume for contradiction B ∈ [(Ψ∗B)∗A] and let
x ∈ min(4Ψ∗B , [[A]]). Then x ∈ [[B]] and, since z ∈ [[A∧¬B]], x ≺Ψ∗B z.
Since y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]) we have y 4Ψ∗A x and so also y ≺Ψ x by
(P∗4) which gives x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[B]]). We have now established x ∈ [[A]],
y ∈ [[¬A]], y 4Ψ∗A x, z 4Ψ y and x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[B]]). Hence we
may deduce, by (α1∗4), that z 4Ψ∗B x, contradicting what we already
established. Hence B 6∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A].
(ii) Regarding (Ω2∗): Assume for contradiction ¬B 6∈ [(Ψ∗B)∗A]. Then
there exists x ∈ [[B]] ∩ min(4Ψ∗B , [[A]]). From ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] we
know x 6∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). Let y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). Then y ≺Ψ∗A x
and y ∈ [[¬A]]. From y ≺Ψ∗A x we also know y ≺Ψ x by (C4∗4) (which
follows from (α2∗4)), so x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[B]]). From ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B]
there exists z ∈ [[A]] ∩ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ B]]). Since y ∈ [[B]] we have
z 4Ψ y. So we have established x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], y ≺Ψ∗A x, z 4Ψ y
and x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[B]]). We can then apply (α2∗4) to deduce z ≺Ψ∗B x,
contradicting the minimality of x. Hence ¬B ∈ [(Ψ∗B)∗A] as required.
(iii) Regarding (Ω3∗): From A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] there exists y ∈ [[¬A]] ∩
min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). Assume for contradiction ¬B 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ B) ∗ A]. Then
there exists x ∈ [[B]]∩min(4Ψ∗B , [[A]]). By the minimality of y we know
y 4Ψ∗A x. Since y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ∈ [[A]] this in turn gives y ≺Ψ x by
(P∗4), so x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[B]]). Since y ∈ [[B]] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] there
must exist some z ∈ [[A∧¬B]] such that z ≺Ψ y. So we have established
x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], y 4Ψ∗A x, z ≺Ψ y and x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[B]]). Hence we
may apply (α3∗4) and deduce z ≺Ψ∗B x, contradicting the minimality
of x. Hence ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A] as required.
Assuming AGM in the background, we now first show that, given (Eq∗), (C1∗),
(C2∗), (β1∗) and (β2∗), (Ωi∗) entails (αi∗4), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. We then show that
(Ω1∗) entails (P∗4).
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(a) (i) Regarding (α1∗4): First note that from the assumptions we al-
ready obtain y 4Ψ∗C x from (β1∗4). If y = z then this clearly
gives us the required conclusion, so we may assume y 6= z. Now,
from x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, we know y ≺Ψ x, by (P∗).
Hence we have established z 4Ψ y ≺Ψ x. If z ∈ [[C]] or x ∈ [[¬C]],
then from z ≺Ψ x we obtain z ≺Ψ∗C x from (C1∗4), (C2∗4) or (C3∗4)
(which follows from (P∗4)) and so we obtain the required conclusion
z 4Ψ∗C x. So assume z ∈ [[¬C]] and x ∈ [[C]]. If y ∈ [[¬C]], then,
from z ∈ [[¬C]] and z 4Ψ y, we obtain z 4Ψ∗C y by (C2∗4), so the
required conclusion follows from this, given y 4Ψ∗C x and tran-
sitivity. So assume y ∈ [[C]]. If z ∈ [[¬A]], then, since y ∈ [[¬A]],
we obtain z 4Ψ∗A y, by (C2∗4). So z 4Ψ∗A x by transitivity
with the assumption y 4Ψ∗A x. We can then apply (β1∗4), us-
ing this together with the assumptions x ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]] and
x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), to obtain the desired result that z 4Ψ∗C x.
So assume z ∈ [[A]]. We have now built up the following assump-
tions about x, y, z: (i) x ∈ [[A ∧ C]], (ii) y ∈ [[¬A ∧ C]], and (iii)
z ∈ [[A ∧ ¬C]]. To show the desired result that z 4Ψ∗C x in this
final case, it suffices, by (γ1∗4) and (Eq
∗
4), to show z 4Ψ∗x∨y x,
which is equivalent to x∨ y 6∈ [(Ψ ∗x∨ y) ∗x∨ z] (since we assume
z 6= y and we know also z 6= x from z ≺Ψ x). To prove this it
suffices, by (Ω1∗) and (Eq∗4), to show ¬(x∨z) 6∈ [Ψ∗x∨y∨z] and
x ∨ z 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ x ∨ z) ∗ x ∨ y]. But the former holds since we have
already established z 4Ψ y ≺Ψ x, while the latter is equivalent to
y 4Ψ∗x∨z x. This will follow from y 4Ψ∗A x and (β1∗4), provided
we have x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]), i.e. z ≺Ψ x. But we have already
established that.
(ii) Regarding (α2∗4): First note that, from the assumptions, we
already obtain y ≺Ψ∗C x from (β2∗4). If y = z, then this clearly
gives us the required conclusion. So we may assume y 6= z. Now,
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from x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, we know y ≺Ψ x, by
(C4∗4). Hence we have established z 4Ψ y ≺Ψ x. If z ∈ [[C]] or
x ∈ [[¬C]], then from z ≺Ψ x we obtain z ≺Ψ∗C x, by (C1∗4),
(C2∗4) or (C3
∗
4), as required. So assume z ∈ [[¬C]] and x ∈ [[C]].
If y ∈ [[¬C]], then, from z ∈ [[¬C]] and z 4Ψ y, we obtain z 4Ψ∗C
y, by (C2∗4). So the required conclusion follows from this with
y ≺Ψ∗C x and transitivity. So assume y ∈ [[C]]. If z ∈ [[¬A]] then,
since y ∈ [[¬A]], we obtain z 4Ψ∗A y by (C2∗4). So z ≺Ψ∗A x, by
transitivity, with the assumption y ≺Ψ∗A x. We can then apply
(β2∗4), using this together with the assumptions x ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]
and x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), to obtain the desired z ≺Ψ∗C x. So assume
z ∈ [[A]]. We now have built up the following assumptions about
x, y, z: (i) x ∈ [[A∧C]], (ii) y ∈ [[¬A∧C]], and (iii) z ∈ [[A∧¬C]]. To
show the desired result that z ≺Ψ∗C x in this final case, it suffices,
by (γ2∗4) and (Eq
∗
4), to show z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x, which is equivalent
to ¬(x ∨ y) ∈ [(Ψ ∗ x ∨ y) ∗ x ∨ z] (since we assume z 6= y and
we know also z 6= x from z ≺Ψ x). To prove this it suffices,
by (Ω2∗) and (Eq∗4), to show ¬(x ∨ z) 6∈ [Ψ ∗ x ∨ y ∨ z] and
¬(x ∨ z) ∈ [(Ψ ∗ x ∨ z) ∗ x ∨ y]. But the former holds since we
already established z 4Ψ y ≺Ψ x, while the latter is equivalent to
y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x. This will follow from y ≺Ψ∗A x and (β2∗4), provided
we have x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]), i.e. z ≺Ψ x. But we have already
established that.
(iii) Regarding (α3∗4): From x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, we
know y 4Ψ x by (C3∗4). Hence we have established z ≺Ψ y 4Ψ x.





4), as required. So assume z ∈ [[¬C]] and
x ∈ [[C]]. From the assumptions, we already know y 4Ψ∗C x, by
(β1∗4). If y ∈ [[¬C]], then, from z ∈ [[¬C]] and z ≺Ψ y, we obtain
z ≺Ψ∗C y, by (C2∗4). So the required conclusion follows from this,
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given y 4Ψ∗C x and transitivity. So assume y ∈ [[C]]. If z ∈ [[¬A]],
then, since y ∈ [[¬A]], we obtain z ≺Ψ∗A y, by (C2∗4). So z ≺Ψ∗A x,
by transitivity, alongside the assumption y 4Ψ∗A x. We can then
apply (β2∗4), using this together with the assumptions x ∈ [[A]],
z ∈ [[¬A]] and x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), to obtain the desired result that
z ≺Ψ∗C x. So assume z ∈ [[A]]. We have now built up the following
assumptions about x, y, z: (i) x ∈ [[A∧C]], (ii) y ∈ [[¬A∧C]], and
(iii) z ∈ [[A ∧ ¬C]]. To show the desired result that z ≺Ψ∗C x in
this final case, it suffices, by (γ2∗4) and (Eq
∗
4), to show z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x,
which is equivalent to ¬(x∨y) ∈ [(Ψ∗x∨y)∗x∨z] (since y 6= z 6= x
from z ≺Ψ y 4Ψ x). To prove this, it suffices, by (Ω3∗) and (Eq∗4),
to show ¬(x∨ y) ∈ [Ψ ∗ x∨ y ∨ z] and x∨ z 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ x∨ z) ∗ x∨ y].
But the former holds, since we already established z ≺Ψ y 4Ψ x,
while the latter is equivalent to y 4Ψ∗x∨z x. This will follow from
y 4Ψ∗A x and (β1∗4), provided we have x 6∈ min(4Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]),
i.e. z ≺Ψ x. But we have already established that.
(b) Regarding (P∗4): We will show that (Ω1
∗) implies (P∗), whose equiv-
alence to (P∗4) is well known. So suppose ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗ B]. We must
show A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. From ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗ B] and the AGM postulates,
we obtain ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B] and also [Ψ ∗ B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗ B) ∗ A]. Since
B ∈ [Ψ ∗ B], by Success, the latter gives us B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ B) ∗ A]. Then,
from this and ¬A 6∈ [Ψ∗A∨B], we obtain the required A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B]
by (Ω1∗). 
Proposition 11. (a) Given AGM, (β3∗4) is equivalent to
(β3∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 ∧A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
(b) Given AGM and (C4∗4), (β4
∗
4) is equivalent to:
(β4∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 ∧ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
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then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
(c) Given AGM and (C3∗4), (α3
∗
4) is equivalent to:
(α3∗) If ¬B2 ∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2], and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
Proof:
(a) (i) From (β3∗4) to (β3
∗): Assume B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗ B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗
A) ∗ B2] and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C]. From the first assumption,
∃z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[B1]])∩[[¬B2]] and, from the second, ∃y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A
, [[B2]])∩ [[B1 ∧¬A]]. From this, we have y ∈ [[B1]] and z ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[B1]]), hence: (1) z 4Ψ y.
Assume now for reductio, the negation of the consequent of (β3∗),
so that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]) ⊆ [[B2 ∧ A]]. So we have ∃x ∈
min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]) ∩ [[B2 ∧ A]]. From this, which entails x ∈
[[B2]], and the facts that y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B2]]) and x ∈ [[B2]], we
recover: (2) y 4Ψ∗A x. From our third initial assumption that
B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ∗C] and the fact that x ∈ [[B2∧A]], we obtain: (3)
x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). Since z ∈ [[¬B2]] and y ∈ [[B2]], we also know:
(4) z 6= y.
As we already know that x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], (1), (2), (3)
and (4) enable us to apply (β3∗4) to infer z 4Ψ∗C x. Given that
we know that z ∈ [[B1 ∧ ¬B2]] and x ∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]),
we can conclude from this last proposition that z ∈ min(4Ψ∗C
, [[B1YB2]]). But we also know that z ∈ [[¬B2]]. So we can conclude
that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 YB2]]) * [[B2 ∧A]] after all, as required.
(ii) From (β3∗) to (β3∗4): Assume the antecedent of (β3
∗
4): x /∈
min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z 4Ψ y, y 4Ψ∗A x, and z 6= y.
If z = x, then it follows from this, by reflexivity of 4Ψ∗C that
z 4Ψ∗C x and we are done. So assume henceforth that z 6= x.
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Assume for reductio that ¬(x ∨ y) ∨ ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗ C], so that ∃w ∈
min(4Ψ, [[C]])∩ [[A∧(x∨y)]]. From x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], we have
[[A ∧ (x ∨ y)]] = {x}. This means that x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). But we
initially assumed this to be false. So we can conclude by reductio:
(1) ¬(x ∨ y) ∨ ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C].
Since z 4Ψ y, z 6= y and z 6= x: (2) x∨y /∈ [Ψ∗z∨y]. Furthermore,
from y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, we can infer: (3) ¬(z ∨ y) ∨ A /∈
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗ x ∨ y].
(1), (2) and (3) then enable us to apply (β3∗), with B1 = z ∨ y
and B2 = x∨y, to recover (x∨y)∧A /∈ [(Ψ∗C)∗ (z∨y)Y (x∨y)].
Given (Eq∗4), this allows us to infer (x∨ y)∧A /∈ [(Ψ ∗C) ∗ z ∨ x],
from which it follows, by x ∈ [[A]], that z 4Ψ∗C x, as required.
(b) (i) From (β4∗4) to (β4
∗): Assume the antecedent of (β4∗): B2 /∈
[Ψ ∗B1], B1 ∧ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2] and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗C]. From
the first assumption, ∃z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[B1]]) ∩ [[¬B2]] and, from the
second, min(4Ψ∗A, [[B2]]) ⊆ [[B1 ∧ ¬A]].
Consider now an arbitrary y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B2]]). By the previous
inclusion, we have y ∈ [[B1]], and so, since z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[B1]]): (1)
z 4Ψ y.
Assume now for reductio, the negation of the consequent of (β4∗),
so that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]) * [[B2 → ¬A]]. From this, ∃x ∈
min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1YB2]])∩[[B2∧A]]. It follows from this that x ∈ [[B2]]
and x ∈ [[A]] and we already know that min(4Ψ∗A, [[B2]]) ⊆ [[¬A]].
Hence: (2) y ≺Ψ∗A x. From our third initial assumption and the
fact that x ∈ [[B2 ∧ A]] we can also infer: (3) x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]).
Furthermore, since z ∈ [[¬B2]] and y ∈ [[B2]], it follows that (4)
z 6= y.
As we already know that x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], (1), (2), (3) and
(4) enable us to apply (β4∗4) to infer z ≺Ψ∗C x. From this, since
z ∈ [[B1∧¬B2]], it follows that x /∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1YB2]]). But this
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contradicts our assumption that x ∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 YB2]]), so we
can conclude, by reductio, that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]) ⊆ [[B2 →
¬A]], as required.
(ii) From (β4∗) to (β4∗4): Assume the antecedent of (β4
∗
4): x /∈
min(4Ψ, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z 4Ψ y, y ≺Ψ∗A x and z 6= y
Assume for reductio that z = x. Then, by z 4Ψ y, we have x 4 y.
Note that, additionally, we have assumed y ≺Ψ∗A x. However,
x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]] give us, by (C4∗4): If x 4Ψ y then x 4Ψ∗A y.
Contradiction. So we can conclude, by reductio, that z 6= x.
Assume now for reductio that ¬(x ∨ y) ∨ ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗ C], so that
∃w ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]])∩[[A∧(x∨y)]]. From x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], we
already have [[A∧(x∨y)]] = {x}. So we can infer that x ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[C]]), contradicting our initial assumption. So we can conclude,
by reductio, that (1) ¬(x ∨ y) ∨ ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], after all.
From z 4Ψ y, z 6= y and z 6= x, we recover: (2) x∨ y /∈ [Ψ ∗ z ∨ y].
From y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x we can infer: (3) (z ∨ y) ∧ ¬A ∈
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗ x ∨ y].
(1), (2) and (3) then enable us to apply (β4∗), with B1 = z∨y and
B2 = x∨ y, to recover (x∨ y)→ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗C) ∗ (z ∨ y)Y (x∨ y)].
Given (Eq∗4), this allows us to infer (x∨y)→ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗C)∗z∨x],
from which it follows, by x ∈ [[A]], that z ≺Ψ∗C x, as required.
(c) (i) From (α3∗4) to (α3
∗): Assume the antecedent of (α3∗): ¬B2 ∈
[Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2] and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C].
From the first principle, we have min(4Ψ, [[B1]]) ⊆ [[¬B2]] and,
from the second, ∃y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B2]])∩[[B1∧¬A]]. Consider now
an arbitrary z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[B1]]). Since y ∈ [[B1]] and y ∈ [[B2]], it
then follows from min(4Ψ, [[B1]]) ⊆ [[¬B2]] that (1) z ≺Ψ y.
Assume now for reductio, the negation of the consequent of (α3∗),
so that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]) * [[B2 → ¬A]]. From this, ∃x ∈
min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 YB2]]) ∩ [[B2 ∧A]].
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From y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B2]]) and x ∈ [[B2]], we can infer: (2) y 4Ψ∗A
x. From our third initial assumption that B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
since x ∈ [[B2 ∧A]], we can derive: (3) x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]).
As we already know that x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], (1), (2), and
(3) enable us to apply (α3∗4) to infer z ≺Ψ∗C x. From this, since
z ∈ [[B1∧¬B2]], it follows that x /∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1YB2]]). But this
contradicts our assumption that x ∈ min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 YB2]]), so we
can conclude, by reductio, that min(4Ψ∗C , [[B1 Y B2]]) ⊆ [[B2 →
¬A]], as required.
(ii) From (α3∗) to (α3∗4): Assume the antecedent of (α4
∗
4): (a) x /∈
min(4Ψ, [[C]]), (b) x ∈ [[A]], (c) y ∈ [[¬A]], (d) z ≺Ψ y, and (e)
y 4Ψ∗A x.
Assume for reductio that z = x. Then, by z ≺Ψ y, we have
x ≺Ψ y. Note that additionally, we have assumed y 4Ψ∗A x.
However, x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]] give us, by (C3∗4): If x ≺Ψ y then
x ≺Ψ∗A y. Contradiction. So we can conclude, by reductio, that
z 6= x.
Assume now for reductio that ¬(x ∨ y) ∨ ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗ C], so that
∃w ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]])∩[[A∧(x∨y)]]. From x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], we
already have [[A∧(x∨y)]] = {x}. So we can infer that x ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[C]]), contradicting our initial assumption. So we can conclude,
by reductio, that (1) ¬(x ∨ y) ∨ ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C], after all.
From z ≺Ψ y and z 6= x, we recover: (2) ¬(x ∨ y) ∈ [Ψ ∗ z ∨ y].
From y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, we can also infer: (3) (z ∨ y) →
A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ x ∨ y].
(1), (2) and (3) then enable us to apply (α3∗), with B1 = z∨y and
B2 = x∨ y, to recover (x∨ y)→ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗C) ∗ (z ∨ y)Y (x∨ y)].
Given (Eq∗4), this allows us to infer (x∨y)→ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗C)∗z∨x],
from which it follows, by x ∈ [[A]], that z ≺Ψ∗C x, as required. 
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(γ4∗4) jointly entail (iDO
∗) and (b) (γ2∗4) and (γ3
∗
4) jointly entail (iDR
∗).
Proof: We establish the result by deriving the following lemma:








(sWPU∗) If y 4Ψ∗A x and z 4Ψ∗C x, then either y 4Ψ∗A∨C x or z 4Ψ∗A∨C x







(sSPU∗) If y ≺Ψ∗A x and z ≺Ψ∗C x, then either y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x or z ≺Ψ∗A∨C x
Given this, the required conclusion follows immediately from Proposition 3 of
[37].
(a) We first note that (C1∗4) and (γ1
∗
4) jointly entail:
(sγ1∗4) If x ∈ [[A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗A∨C x
From this, it follows that (sWPU∗) holds whenever either x ∈ [[A]] or
x ∈ [[C]]. So assume henceforth that x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]].
Now assume y 4Ψ∗A x, z 4Ψ∗C x, and, for contradiction, that both
x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y and x ≺Ψ∗A∨C z. If either (i) y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and
y ∈ [[A]], or (ii) y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and y ∈ [[C]] then, by (γ4∗4), it follows
from x ∈ [[¬(A∨C)]] and x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y that x ≺Ψ∗A y, contradicting our
assumption that y 4Ψ∗A x. So assume that either y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]])
or y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]. By parallel reasoning from x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and
x ≺Ψ∗A∨C z, we end up with the assumption that either z ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[C]]) or z ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]].
Assume that y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]. By (C2∗4), it then follows from this,
x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y that x ≺Ψ y. But from x ≺Ψ y,
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x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and (C2∗4) again, we have x ≺Ψ∗A y, contradicting our
assumption that y 4Ψ∗A x. Similarly, assuming that z ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]
leaves us with x ≺Ψ∗C z, this time contradicting our assumption that
z 4Ψ∗C x.
So assume that y /∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and z /∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]. It follows that
both y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]).
It follows from x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y that y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ C]]). From this
and y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), we obtain min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ C]]) = min(4Ψ, [[C]]).
Since it also follows from x ≺Ψ∗A∨C z that z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ C]]), we
have z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]), contradicting our assumption that z ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[C]]). Hence either y 4Ψ∗A∨C x or z 4Ψ∗A∨C x, as required.
(b) We first note that (C1∗4) and (γ2
∗
4) jointly entail:
(sγ2∗4) If x ∈ [[A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x
From this, it follows that (sSPU∗) holds whenever either x ∈ [[A]] or
x ∈ [[C]]. So assume henceforth that x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]].
Now assume y ≺Ψ∗A x, z ≺Ψ∗C x, and, for contradiction, that both
x 4Ψ∗A∨C y and x 4Ψ∗A∨C z. If either (i) y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and
y ∈ [[A]], or (ii) y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and y ∈ [[C]] then, by (γ3∗4), it follows
from x ∈ [[¬(A∨C)]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y that x 4Ψ∗A y, contradicting our
assumption that y ≺Ψ∗A x. So assume that either y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]])
or y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]. By parallel reasoning from x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and
x ≺Ψ∗A∨C z, we end up with the assumption that either z ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[C]]) or z ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]].
Assume that y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]. By (C2∗4), it then follows from this,
x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y that x 4Ψ y. But from x 4Ψ y,
x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and (C2∗4) again, we have x 4Ψ∗A y, contradicting our
assumption that y ≺Ψ∗A x. Similarly, assuming that z ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]
66
leaves us with x 4Ψ∗C z, this time contradicting our assumption that
z ≺Ψ∗C x.
So assume that y /∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and z /∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]]. It follows that
both y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]).
From the fact that x ∈ [[¬(A∨C)]], it follows from x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y that y /∈
min(4Ψ, [[A∨C]]). From this and y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), we obtain min(4Ψ
, [[A∨C]]) = min(4Ψ, [[C]]). Since it also follows, by x ∈ [[¬(A∨C)]], from
x ≺Ψ∗A∨C z that z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∨ C]]), we have z /∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]),
contradicting our assumption that z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[C]]). Hence either
y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x or z ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, as required. 
Proposition 14. Given AGM and (C1∗4), (a) (γ1
∗
4) is equivalent to (iDI
∗) and
(b) (γ2∗4) is equivalent to (iK7
∗).
Proof: We first establish the following lemma:
Lemma 5. (γ1∗4) and (γ2
∗
4) are respectively equivalent, in the presence of
(C1∗4), to
(sγ1∗4) If x ∈ [[A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x then y 4Ψ∗A∨C x
(sγ2∗4) If x ∈ [[A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x then y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x
(sγ1∗4) and (sγ2
∗





in which we do not require y ∈ [[¬A]] in the antecedent. So it is sufficient to
show that (C1∗4) entails that, when x, y ∈ [[A]], the following both hold: (i) if
y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗A∨C x and (ii) if y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x. This is
an immediate consequence of the fact that (C1∗4) entails: If x, y ∈ [[A]], then
x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ∗A∨C y. Regarding the proof of this last implication: It
follows from (C1∗4) that, if x, y ∈ [[A ∨ C]], then x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y iff x ≺Ψ y, and
hence, since [[A]] ⊆ [[A ∨ C]], that:
(1) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ∗A∨C y iff x 4Ψ y
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But (C1∗4) also directly gives us
(2) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
From (1) and (2), we then recover the required result.
We now return to the proof of the theorem. In view of the above, we now
simply need to prove equivalences between (iDI∗) and (iK7∗) and (sγ1∗4) and
(sγ2∗4), respectively. Regarding (iK7
∗) and (sγ2∗4), it is convenient here to use
the following equivalent formulation of (iK7∗):
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ⊆ Cn([(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ∪ {A})
Here, then, is the derivation of the various implications:
(a) (i) From (sγ1∗4) to (iDI
∗): Suppose ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ B]. Then
there exists x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]])∩[[A]]. Let y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]).
We must show y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]). Assume for contradiction
that y /∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]). Then x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y. So, since x ∈ [[A]],
by (sγ1∗4), we have x ≺Ψ∗A y. But this contradicts y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A
, [[B]]). Hence y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]), as required.
(ii) From (iDI∗)to (sγ1∗4): Suppose x ∈ [[A]] and x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y. We
must show x ≺Ψ∗A y. From x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y and x ∈ [[A]], we know
¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ (x ∨ y)]. So, by (iDI∗), it follows that [(Ψ ∗
A∨C) ∗ (x∨ y)] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ (x∨ y)]. Moreover x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y gives
us ¬y ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨C) ∗ (x ∨ y)], hence ¬y ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ (x ∨ y)] and
therefore x ≺Ψ∗A y.
(b) (i) From (sγ2∗4) to (iK7
∗): Establishing (iK7∗) amounts to showing
that, if x ∈ [[[(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ B]]] ∩ [[A]], then x ∈ [[[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]]].
So assume x ∈ [[[(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ B]]] ∩ [[A]] and, for reductio, x /∈
[[[(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]]], i.e. there exists y ∈ [[B]] such that y ≺Ψ∗A x. Since
x ∈ [[A]], it follows, by (sγ2∗4), that y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x and hence, since
y ∈ [[B]], that x /∈ [[[(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ B]]]. Contradiction. Hence
x ∈ [[[(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]]], as required.
68
(ii) From (iK7∗) to (sγ2∗4): Let x ∈ [[A]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y. We must
show x 4Ψ∗A y. From x 4Ψ∗A∨C y, we know x ∈ min(≺Ψ∗A∨C
, {x, y}), i.e. x ∈ [[[(Ψ ∗A∨C) ∗ (x∨ y)]]]. Since x ∈ [[A]], it follows
by (iK7∗) that x ∈ [[[(Ψ∗A)∗ (x∨ y)]]], i.e. x ∈ min(≺Ψ∗A, {x, y}).
So x 4Ψ∗A y, as required. 
Proposition 15. (iK8∗) is equivalent to (sP∗4), given AGM and (C1
∗
4).
Proof: For convenience, we shall work with the following equivalent formulation
of (iK8∗):
If ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then Cn([(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ∪ {A})
⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
(i) From (sP∗4) to (iK8
∗): Assume ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A∨C) ∗B], i.e. that there
exists x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]])∩ [[A]]. Let y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). We need
to show y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]])∩ [[A]]. So assume for contradiction that
the latter is false, i.e. that one of the following two claims is true: (1)
y /∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]) and y ∈ [[A]], (2) y ∈ [[¬A]].
Assume (1). Since x, y ∈ [[B]], it follows that x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y. We have
already noted, in the proof of Lemma 5 that the following principle
follows from (C1∗4): If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ∗A∨C y. Since
x, y ∈ [[A]] and x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y, we therefore have x ≺Ψ∗A y, contradicting
our assumption that y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]).
Assume (2). Since x ∈ [[A]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y, it then follows
by (sP∗4) that x ≺Ψ∗A y, again contradicting our assumption that
y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]).
(ii) From (iK8∗) to (sP∗4): Suppose x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y.
We must show x ≺Ψ∗A y. From x ∈ [[A]] and x 4Ψ∗A∨C y, it follows
that ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ x ∨ y]. So by (iK8∗), we have Cn([(Ψ ∗
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A ∨ C) ∗ x ∨ y] ∪ {A}) ⊆ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ x ∨ y]. Since y ∈ [[¬A]], we have
¬y ∈ Cn([(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗ x ∨ y] ∪ {A}). Therefore ¬y ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ x ∨ y]
and hence x ≺Ψ∗A y, as required. 
Proposition 16. (sP∗4) is satisfied by both lexicographic and restrained revision
operators.
Proof: Regarding lexicographic revision, the proof is trivial, since the latter
satisfies If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y.
Regarding restrained revision: Assume x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), otherwise the
conclusion follows by Success. Assume y ≺Ψ x, other wise the conclusion follows
by (P∗4). From these assumptions, we have y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x by the characteristic
principle of restrained revision. 
Proposition 18. The semantic counterparts of the right-to-left and left-to-right
directions of (iDF∗)(i) are respectively:
(γ5∗4) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
(γ6∗4) If y ∈ [[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x.
Proof: For convenience, we rewrite (γ5∗4) and (γ6
∗
4) as: If x, y ∈ [[¬C]] and
y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, then y 4Ψ∗A x, and, if y ∈ [[¬C]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗A x
(a) (i) From (γ5∗4) to the right-to-left direction of (iDF
∗)(i): As-
sume min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬C]] and y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]). As-
sume for reductio that y /∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). Then there exists
x ∈ [[¬C]] such that y 4Ψ∗A∨C x but x ≺Ψ∗A y. Since y ∈ [[¬C]],
this contradicts (γ5∗4). So y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]), as required.
(ii) From the right-to-left direction of (iDF∗)(i) to (γ5∗4): We
consider (γ5∗4) contrapositively. Assume x, y ∈ [[¬C]] and x ≺Ψ∗A
y. From x, y ∈ [[¬C]], it follows that ¬C ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ x ∨ y].
From x ≺Ψ∗A y, we have x ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ x ∨ y]. Since ¬C ∈
[(Ψ ∗A∨C) ∗ x∨ y], by the right-to-left direction of (iDF∗)(i), we
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then have x ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨C) ∗ x ∨ y]. It then follows from this that
x ≺Ψ∗A∨C y, as required.
(b) (i) From (γ6∗4) to the left-to-right direction of (iDF
∗)(i): As-
sume min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]) ⊆ [[¬C]] and x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A, [[B]]). As-
sume for reductio that x /∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]). Then there exists
y ∈ [[¬C]] such that y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x but x 4Ψ∗A y, contradicting
(γ6∗4). Hence x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A∨C , [[B]]), as required.
(ii) From the left-to-right direction of (iDF∗)(i) to (γ6∗4): As-
sume y ∈ [[¬C]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x. It follows from this that
¬C ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ x ∨ y)]. By the left-to-right direction of
(iDF∗)(i), we then have [(Ψ ∗ A ∨ C) ∗ x ∨ y]] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ x ∨ y].
Furthermore, y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x leaves us with ¬x ∈ [(Ψ∗A∨C)∗x∨y)]
and hence, by the preceding inclusion ¬x ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗x∨y)]. Hence
y ≺Ψ∗A x, as required. 
Proposition 19. Neither (γ5∗4) nor (γ6
∗
4) are generally satisfied by POI revi-
sion operators.
Proof: Since we know that restrained revision operators are POI revision op-
erators, it will suffice to show that they violate the principle. So consider the
countermodel below, where ∗ denotes a restrained revision operator. We have
[[¬A ∧ ¬C]] ≺Ψ∗A∨C [[¬A ∧ C]], but [[¬A ∧ C]] ≺Ψ∗C [[¬A ∧ ¬C]], contradicting
both principles.














Proposition 20. Both (γ5∗4) and (γ6
∗
4) are satisfied by lexicographic revision
operators.
Proof: We prove the result in relation to (γ5∗4), since the case of (γ6
∗
4) is
analogous. Assume x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x. We consider three cases:
(i) x ∈ [[C]]: Assume for reductio that y ∈ [[¬C]]. Then, since x ∈ [[A ∨
C]] and y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]], lexicographic revision yields x 4Ψ∗A∨C y.
Contradiction. Hence y ∈ [[C]]. From x, y ∈ [[A ∨ C]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x,
we obtain y 4Ψ x by (C1∗4), and from this, in conjunction with x, y ∈
[[C]] we recover the required result that y 4Ψ∗C x, again by (C1∗4).
(ii) x ∈ [[¬C]] and y ∈ [[C]]: Then, since x ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and y ∈ [[A ∨ C]],
lexicographic revision yields y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, as required.
(iii) x, y ∈ [[¬C]]: From x, y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and y 4Ψ∗A∨C x, we obtain
y 4Ψ x by (C2∗4), and from this, in conjunction with x, y ∈ [[¬C]] we
recover the required result that y 4Ψ∗C x, again by (C2∗4). 
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